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Freedom of Contract in an Augmented
Reality: The Case of Consumer Contracts
Scott R. Peppet
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that freedom of contract will take on different meaning in a world
in which new technology makes information about places, goods, people, firms, and
contract terms available to contracting parties anymhere, at any time. In particular, our
increasingly "augmented reality" calls into question leading justifications for distrusting
consumer contracts and strengthens traditional understandings of freedom of contract.
This is largely a descriptive and predictive argument: This Article aims to introduce
contract law to these technologies and consider their most likely effects. It certainly has
normative implications, however. Given that the vast majority of consumer contracting
occurs in physical space, the introduction of ubiquitous digital information into these
transactions has profound consequences for contract law.
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[I]ndividuals buy a[n] . . . automobile without knowing whether the
car they buy will be good or a lemon. .. . [The bad cars sell at the same
price as good cars since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the dif-
ference between a good and a bad car; only the seller knows.
-Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof
Worried about ending up with a used car that's a lemon? . . .A
CARFAX Vehicle History Report can include information about
reported lemon titles, as well as other issues such as flood damage
and open recalls. If the used car you're buying is a lemon, CARFAX
can help you find out.
-www.lemoncheck.com 2
INTRODUCTION
Digital information suddenly pervades our experience of physical space.
Roughly 35 percent of American adults own a smartphone;3 among those under
the age of forty-five, the figure jumps to 58 percent.4 Smartphone adoption
is strong across demographic and socioeconomic categories,s and is increas-
ing quickly.' In 2011, smartphone sales were, for the first time, greater than
1. George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970).
2. CARFAX LEMON CHECK, http://www.lemoncheck.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
3. There is no standard definition of what constitutes a smartphone. In general, such devices
combine mobile internet connectivity, computational power, location awareness, and an operating
system that permits software development. For a discussion of the definition of smartphone,
see Andrew Charlesworth, The Ascent of Smartphone, ENGINEERING & TECH., Feb. 2009, at
32, 32-33.
4. See AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET &AM. LIFE PROJECT, 35% OF AMERICAN ADULTS
OWN A SMARTPHONE (2011), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/
2011/PIPSmartphones.pdf (providing statistics); see alo Mike Isaac, Smartphones Dominate
U.S. Mobile Purchases, WIRED, June 30, 2011, http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/06/
android-iphone-growth (providing statistics).
5. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 2 (reporting high adoption rates among African Americans and
Latinos and among those younger than twenty-nine in lower-income households).
6. See Sean Ludwig, Annual Smarphone Sales ffWi1Top 1 Billion by 2016, Says IMS, VENTUREBEAT
(July 27, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/07/27/annual-smartphone-sales-will-top-1-billion-
by-2016-says-ims (reporting increased smartphone sales year after year, and projecting sales of one
billion devices by 2016).
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personal computer sales,7 and analysts predict that the majority of American
adults will own a smartphone by the second quarter of 2012.8
This surge in ubiquitous internet access has opened the door to a range
of mobile applications designed to saturate our daily experiences with previously
unavailable information. In this increasingly "augmented reality,"9 for example,
a consumer shopping in a bricks-and-mortar retailer can learn instantly about a
product's capabilities, safety record, environmental friendliness-or contract
terms. Snap a picture of an object-such as a book cover or DVD-and Google
Goggles will return search results about that object.1 0 Use your phone's camera
to scan the bar code on a potential purchase, and Amazon or Consumer
Reports will instantly return price comparisons and consumer reviews." Enter
a merchant's name or enable your smartphone's location capabilities, and the
7. See Jake Mintz, When the Web Meets the Real World, FORBES, Aug. 4, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/ciocentral/2011/08/04/when-the-web-meets-the-real-world-moving-beyond-qr-codes
(providing statistics and describing a new wave of mobile internet applications).
8. See Horace Dediu, Phone Tipping Point Countdown Reset, AsYMco (May 7, 2011), http://www.
asymco.com/2011/05/07/phone-tipping-point-countdown-reset (reporting that smartphone
adoption is increasing by 1.3 percent per month).
9. I will generally use the term augmented reality (AR) to describe the mobile, pervasive computing
technologies that are rapidly bringing together physical and digital space. The term was coined
by Tom Caudell and David Mizell. See generally Thomas P. Caudell & David W. Mizell,
Augmented Reality: An Application of Heads Up Display Technology to Manual Manufacturing
Processes, PROC. OF THE IEEE TWENTY-FIFTH HAWAII INT'L CONF. ON SYS. SCl. 659
(1992). Augmented reality is often defined as augmenting the physical senses-particularly
visual-with digital information. See, e.g., Ronald T. Azuma, A Survey ofAugmented Reality,
PRESENCE: TELEOPERATORS & VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 355 (1997) ("AR allows the user
to see the real world, with virtual objects superimposed upon or composited with the real world.");
Paul Milgram & Fumio Kishino, A Taxonomy ofMixed Reality Visual Displays, E77-D IEICE
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. &SYS. 1321, 1322 (1994) (defining augmented reality as "any case
in which an otherwise real environment is 'augmented' by means of virtual (computer graphic)
objects"). I use the term somewhat more broadly. My interest is in the convergence of digital and
physical space generally, not merely in the real-time augmentation of digital video. Augmented
reality is the most useful term to describe all of the various ways in which technology is
beginning to bring the digital and the physical worlds together. Other candidates include
ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing, physical computing, tangible media, ambient
informatics, "wearware," and "everyware." See generally WOODROW BARFIELD & THOMAS
CAUDELL, FUNDAMENTALS OF WEARABLE COMPUTERS AND AUGMENTED REALITY,
at xii (2001) (reviewing various terminology); ADAM GREENFIELD, EVERYWARE: THE
DAWNING AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 1 (2006) (same).
10. Google Goggles is an image-based search service. See Google Goggles, GOOGLE MOBILE,
http://www.google.com/mobile/goggles/#text (last visited July 7, 2011).
11. See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited July 5, 2011); CONSUMER REPORTS,
http://www.consumerreports.org (last visited July 5, 2011). Various others offer similar
services. See, e.g., SCANLIFE, http://www.scanlife.com (last visited July 1, 2011) (providing
barcode and augmented reality code scanning applications for various smartphone platforms).
Better Business Bureau's mobile app will return reviews and ratings of that
seller or other local businesses, grade each merchant on a scale of A+ to F, and
indicate which merchants are Better Business Bureau accredited.' 2 Enter
the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of the used car you are test driv-
ing, and CarFax will tell you whether you are buying a lemon."
Our augmented reality can provide information about more than just
goods, firms, and contract terms: We also have access to information about each
other. Consider a startling example. In July 2011, privacy economist Alessandro
Acquisti demonstrated a prototype of an iPhone application that could take
a photograph of a person, compare that photograph to the millions of public
profile pictures available through Facebook,' 4 and, if a match were found,
guess the person's name and the first five digits of that person's Social
Security number." The application succeeds a staggering 30 percent of the
time.'6 Acquisti notes that "[t]he application is an example of augmented
reality, in which offline and online data blend together.... In addition to its
privacy implications. . . the age of augmented reality. . . may carry even
deeper-reaching. . . implications."" Although privacy scholars have consi-
dered the implications of facial recognition technologies,' 8 what might these
technologies imply for contract law? What will it mean when merchants can
identify each consumer, search for information about that consumer, and
12. See BETTER BUSINESSBUREAU, http://www.bbb.org (last visitediJuly 5, 2011).
13. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting CarFax's "LemonCheck" service).
14. Facebook requires that all users display their name and at least one profile picture publicly.
There are no privacy settings for these public aspects of a user's profile. See FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com (last visited July 1, 2011).
15. See Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross & Fred Stutzman, Privacy in the Age of Augmented
Reality 5 (working draft) (on file with author) ("To illustrate the possibility of real-time
identification, we developed a smart phone demo application that captures the image of a person
and then overlays on the screen her predicted name and SSN."); see alo Julia Angwin, Face-ID
Toot Pose New Risk, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531
11903341404576480371062384798.html (describing Acquisti et al.'s study).
16. See Acquisti et al., supra note 15, at 5.
17. Id. For example, police departments in several states have begun deploying iPhone-based facial
recognition applications to identify criminals. See Emily Steel &Julia Angwin, Device Raises Fear
ofFacialProfiing, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.con/article/SB00014240527023
03678704576440253307985070.html ("Dozens of law-enforcement agencies from Massachusetts
to Arizona are preparing to outfit their forces with controversial hand-held facial-recognition
devices as soon as September... ."). In addition to facial recognition, the hardware add-on for
the iPhone can scan irises and take fingerprints. Id.
18. For a useful overview, see Note, In the Face ofDanger: FacialRecognition and the Limits ofPrivacy
Law, 120 HAR. L. REV. 1870 (2007).
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tailor the shopping experience or their standard form contracts based on that
consumer's characteristics?'
This Article considers the implications of these recent developmentS20
for contract law, and, particularly, for freedom of contract. Consider the classic
case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,21 in which the D.C. Circuit
famously held that a contract could be unconscionable if there was "an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."22 From 1957 to
1962, the Walker-Thomas furniture store had extended credit to Ms. Williams
for the purchase of various pieces of furniture. In each instance, the contract
contained a cross-collateralization provision making each purchased item colla-
teral for every other item; no item could be paid off completely until all other
items had been paid off. In 1962, Ms. Williams purchased a stereo for
$514; when she defaulted on her payments, the store sought to repossess many
of her earlier purchases as well. The court found the clause unenforceable, in
part because Ms. Williams was not sufficiently informed about the colla-
teralization clause.23
For a moment, however, imagine that Walker-Thomas had occurred today.
How might the facts and outcome have been different? What if Ms. Williams
had been standing in the furniture store with her smartphone, and could
easily have searched for information on the store's reputation or the fairness
of its contracts?24  What if she had used the Pissed Consumer app on her
iPhone to learn that the furniture store had received five red stars, indicating
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. Most of these services launched their mobile applications in the first half of 2011. The Better
Business Bureau application launched June 22, 2011; the Consumer Reports application
launched June 8, 2011; the Cars.com application launched on May 11, 2011, and integrated
Carfax.com vehicle reports on August 1, 2011. Although to avoid tedium this Article does
not catalog this throughout the Article, most of the mobile services discussed in this Article
were launched in late 2010 or early 2011.
21. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22. Id at 449; see also Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 552-54 (1967) (drawing the distinction between procedural and substan-
tive unconscionability).
23. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 449.
24. There is evidence that the reputation of the store was well known in the neighborhood. See
William Raspberry, The Day the City's Fury Was Unleashed: Lessons of the Riots, WASH. POST,
Apr. 3, 1998, at Al (suggesting that the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was targeted by looters
during the 1968 riots as revenge for its well-known business practices).
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a high volume of consumer complaints about its contracts; 25 or if her GPS-
equipped phone had automatically notified her when she entered the store
that the furniture seller had been branded "consumer unfriendly" and its
location electronically tagged by a local consumer group; or if her social network
used Facebook Places or Foursquare, 26 and had left location-based electronic
notes warning her about the store's practices? Moreover, what if the written
contract itself had contained a quick response (QR) code (Figure 1) in the
margins next to the collateralization clause that, when scanned by her
phone's camera, played a short video explaining the clause to Ms. Williams in
laymen's terms?27 Would any of these quite plausible modern scenarios have
changed the outcome of this seminal contracts case, the unconscionability
doctrine, or, more generally, the contours of freedom of contract?
FIGURE 1.
25. Pissedconsumer.com is a popular website that allows consumers to review products and
merchants; it also provides a mobile application for use on smartphones. See PISSED CONSUMER,
http://www.pissedconsumer.com (last visited July 5, 2011). A search of Pissed Consumer reveals
hundreds of reviews regarding credit-related repossessions, like those at issue in Walker-Thomas.
See, e.g., AmeriCredit, PISSED CONSIMER, http://amerieredit.pissedconsumer.com (last visited
July 5, 2011) (providing over 150 complaints about the repossession tactics of AmeriCredit);
see abAo infra Part I.B (discussing this and other consumer review services).
26. The popular "check in" service that Foursquare is actively promoting includes consumer reviews
as a part of its offerings. See Rachel King, Foursquare Takes on Yelp With Public User Review
Pages, ZDNET (Aug. 1, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/forusquare-takes-on-
yelp-with-public-user-review-pages/53677.
27. A QR code is a matrix or two-dimensional barcode readable by QR-enabled readers, cell
phones, computers, or other devices. QR codes can be created at no cost, and QR readers can be
downloaded free of charge. If the reader scans Figure 1 with a QR-enabled reader, the computer
will be redirected to a web-enabled video introduction to augmented reality and to the main
arguments of this Article. For those without a QR code reader, the video can be seen by visiting
Scott Peppet, Augmented Reality & Freedom of Contract, available at http://1awweb.colorado.edu/
events/mediaDetails.jsp?id= 2807 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
These are no longer the speculations of science fiction. These are today's
technologies, and they create pressing questions for contract law. This Article
focuses on the impact of an augmented reality on the interpretation and
enforcement of contracts, and, particularly, on courts' willingness to police
consumer contracts for unfair or one-sided terms. It explores this topic using the
case of consumer standard form contracts-like the contract in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas-because in the last few decades contract scholars have argued
extensively about freedom of contract in this context.28 It is part of a nascent
body of legal scholarship grappling with the impact of information technology
developments on markets, law, and society. Traces of this thought can be found
in information privacy scholarship, 29 information technology writings,o and
legal literature considering new technologies.3 1 This Article is the first in
this line of scholarship to consider the implications of an augmented reality for
contract law.
These implications are profound. Although contract scholars in the last
decade have focused extensively on e-commerce and online contracting, 32
28. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 240 (1995) ("The problems raised by the use of form contracts have been a major
preoccupation of contract law scholars for the past forty years."). Standard form contracts
are an obsession for contract scholars. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form
Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control ofLawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 529 (1971); Symposium, 'Boilerplate"' Foundations on Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV.
821 (2006).
29. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY
ON THE INTERNET (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death ofPrivacy?,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1461 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz &William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2177 (2003).
30. See, e.g., OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993); GREENFIELD, supra note 9.
31. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 93 (2005); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" For Everyone (and
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving"];
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation].
32. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L.
REV. 1165 (2002); Robert A. Hillman &Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 478 (2002) (discussing online or e-commerce standard
form contracting); Robert J. Mann &Travis Siebeneicher, just One Click: The Reality oflnternet
Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984 (2008); Peter P. Swire, Tustwrap: The Importance
of Legal Rules to Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.. 847 (2003); Hal R.
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online commerce accounts for only 7 percent of all U.S. shopping, despite
years of rapid growth.33 Augmented reality, however, changes the 93 percent
of consumer transactions that occur in Wal-Marts and shopping malls,
automobile showrooms and Best Buys. Augmented reality reduces the dif-
ferences between online and offline exchange; we are increasingly online all
the time. Contract law and scholarship must begin to consider how ubiquitous
information alters bricks-and-mortar transactions, which comprise the vast
majority of consumer contracts.
Welfare economics generally assumes that informed, rational deci-
sionmakers will reach efficient, welfare-maximizing contracts in competitive
markets.34 Contract scholars have long argued about whether these two
conditions hold in the consumer context-whether, in short, consumers are
sufficiently informed and rational to read and understand standard form
contracts.35 Classical law and economics argues that they are, and that
markets will therefore discipline firms to only offer reasonable standard form
consumer contracts. Some disagree: Asymmetric information arguments for
distrusting consumer contracts claim that consumers have insufficient infor-
mation for markets to correct standard form contracts; bounded rationality
arguments for policing consumer contracts claim that consumers are insuf-
ficiently rational to do so. 3 6  Together, these two arguments have justified
Varian, Computer Mediated Transactions, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2010) (exploring the ways in
which computer technology is changing transactions and contracting); Avery Wiener Katz, Is
Electronic Contracting Diferent? Contract Law in the Information Age 5 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
33. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, E-Commerce Growth Slows, but Still Out-Paces Retail, DIGITS (Mar.
8, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/03/08/e-commerce-growth-slows-but-
still-out-paces-retail. Estimates assume that e-commerce might increase to 8 percent by 2014 and
to 20 percent at some point in the future-still a notable minority of transactions. See id
34. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3 (8th ed. 2011); Benjamin E.
Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law § 2.2.1, in THE HANDBOOK
OF LAW & ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (discussing core
principles of the welfare economics of contract).
35. See infta Parts IIA, III.A.
36. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 231 (5th ed. 2008) ("The
farther the facts depart from the ideal of perfect rationality and zero transaction costs, the stronger
the case for judges' regulating the terms of the contract by law."); Katz, supra note 32, at 5
(discussing these reasons as the "canonical justifications for interfering with contractual freedom
on efficiency grounds").
In addition, we sometimes restrict freedom of contract because of externalities and concerns
about commodification. Augmented reality will also change these justifications, but that is not
relevant to consumer standard form contracts. I hope to explore the impact of augmented reality
on externality and commodification arguments in another essay.
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judicial scrutiny of consumer standard form contracts in the past decades using
unconscionability and other similar contract doctrines.
This Article makes three claims relevant to these debates. First, an aug-
mented reality profoundly changes the transaction cost economics of consumer
contracting.37 In particular, changes in information technology have radically
lowered the costs of both sorting 8 and signaling"-the two economic means
by which consumers and firms choose and learn about their contracting
partners40-and have made new forms of sorting and signaling possible in tra-
ditional bricks-and-mortar transactions. Part I makes this argument by briefly
introducing augmented reality technologies to the legal literature. 4' It then
reviews a typology of the types of information these technologies can deliver
37. For an introduction to transaction cost economics, see Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233 (1979)
(describing economics as "preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction
costs"); see also Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 41 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005) (providing
an overview of the field).
38. Sorting or "screening" theory assumes that an uninformed party will filter counterparties
based on what observable characteristics or information are available, if the desired charac-
teristic is unobservable. See, e.g., Roger Klein, Richard Spady & Andrew Weiss, Factors Affecting
the Output and Quit Propensities of Production Workers, 58 REv. ECON. STUD. 929 (1991)
(exploring the example of employers sorting job applicants based on high school graduation as
a proxy for perseverance).
39. Signaling "refers to actions taken by an informed party for the sole purpose of credibly
revealing his private information." N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
487 (5th ed. 2009). Put differently, "[information asymmetries] may give rise to signaling,
which is the attempt by the informed side of the market to communicate information that the
other side would find valuable." WILLIAM A. McEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 619 (5th ed. 2000). Economists focus on signals that are difficult to fake and
thus are self-verifying. See, e.g., DIANE COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS
REALLY DO AND WHY IT MATTERS 163 (rev. ed. 2010) (describing how Indian villagers
borrow huge sums to pay for expensive weddings to signal their caste and social status); Paul
Herbig & John Milewicz, Market Signaling Behavior in the Service Industry, 1 ACAD.
MARKETING STUD. J. 35, 39 (1997) (explaining that service businesses like banks and law firms
spend vast sums on elaborate office buildings to signal their quality and solvency to potential
clients). Modern signaling theory began with Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QJ.
ECON. 355 (1973); see also Michael Spence, Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling
PrerequisitesjorJobs, 90 QJ. ECON. 51 (1976) (discussing his classic example of signaling through
educational achievement).
40. Sorting and signaling are the two ways in which we overcome information asymmetries. For an
overview of sorting and signaling, see John G. Riley, Silver Signal: Twenty-Five Years of Screening
and Signaling, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 432 (2001); see also Michael Spence, Informational
Aspects ofMarket Structure:An Introduction, 90 QJ. ECON. 591, 592 (1976) ("[Signaling and
sorting] are opposite sides of the same coin.").
41. See infaPart I.A.
to today's consumers: information about places, goods, people, firms, and contract
terms.42 This typology provides many examples that demonstrate that in an
augmented reality, consumers and sellers can sort and signal each other more
effectively and at lower cost than they could in the traditional analog economy.
Second, these decreased sorting and signaling costs may at least partially
undermine asymmetric information arguments for distrusting consumer stan-
dard form contracts. In an augmented reality, consumers can more easily sort
firms and firms' contracts using proxies of contract quality such as consumer
reviews, thereby bypassing firms with oppressive or one-sided contract terms
(and creating market pressure on such firms to reform their contracts). When
consumers have mobile internet applications that search over 40 million consumer
reviews for over 4 million products from the aggregated websites of over one
thousand retailers and consumer review services-as they do today using the
SearchReviews mobile app4 3-firms are less likely to use one-sided or oppres-
sive contract terms.44 This makes it more likely that standard form consumer
contracts will be fair, and thus courts in an augmented reality are more likely
to enforce such contracts as written. Part II presents this argument, 45 but also
considers possible complications to it.4 6
Third, the information available in an augmented reality may help "debias"47
consumers and make their decisions more rational. Part III argues that
decreased sorting and signaling costs challenge the bounded rationality argu-
ments that behavioral law and economics scholars have made in the consumer
contracting context. 48 In particular, augmented reality can provide consum-
ers with highly salient and easily available information about contractual risks at
the point of sale.4 9 This makes it more likely that consumers will evaluate
contracting decisions rationally, which in turn suggests that, in an augmented
reality, courts may more often enforce consumer contracts as written.
42. Seeinfra PartI.B.
43. See SEARCHREVIEWS, http://www.searchreviews.com (last visited July 5, 2011) (providing a
mobile barcode-based application that searches a massive aggregated data set of consumer reviews).
44. See infa Part JJ.B.1 (discussing this sorting argument).
45. See infraPart 11.
46. See infra Part JJ.B.2.
47. On debiasing generally, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35
J. LEGAL STUD. 199,210 (2006).
48. See infra Part III (discussing behavioral law and economics arguments about cognitive biases
in standard form contracts and the range of possible debiasing techniques).
49. See infra Part II.B (discussing how such information may counteract optimism and
availability effects).
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Taken together, these three claims support the broader conclusion that
technological change that increases the quantity and quality of information
available to contracting parties is likely to strengthen traditional approaches
to freedom of contract in the context of consumer contracts. This Article
thus concludes by making a general assertion about contract theory: (1) the
contours of what we consider freedom of contract are fundamentally shaped
by the availability of information, and (2) the availability and structure of
information in the economy is not a constant but is instead dependent on the
state of evolution of the economy's information architecture. Debates that
assume some intrinsic nature of freedom of contract, autonomy, consent,
subjugation, and bargaining power are fundamentally contingent. These
concepts change as information economics change. Our historical and technol-
ogical moment begets one conception of the contours of freedom of contract;
other moments will beget other conceptions. To me this seems obvious, and
yet there is remarkably little in contract theory that acknowledges the reality
of technological and historical change.5 0 Instead, certain technological and
economic facts are generally taken as given, and debate ensues based on the
faulty premise that those givens will remain constant into the future. This
exploration of how augmented reality may change contract law demonstrates
that contract scholars must acknowledge the technological and historical
contingencies of their arguments, particularly in this era of rapid technol-
ogical change.
I. SORTING AND SIGNALING IN AN AUGMENTED REALITY
Each time you watch professional sports on television, you experience
augmented reality technologies: the yellow line drawn across a football field
showing yardage to a first down, the strike box showing a baseball pitcher's
virtual target, or the flags of Olympic swimmers seeming to shimmer in their
pool lanes. 1 These technologies are everywhere and are increasingly powerful.5 2
50. For a notable exception, see Katz, supra note 32, at 1 ("[T]he growth of electronic com-
merce reflects changes in the relative importance of various institutional transaction
costs .... Accordingly, arrangements that were optimal. . . under previous configurations of
transaction costs may no longer be so under configurations that will develop in the future.").
51. See Jeff Braun, American Football: That Magic Yellow Line, ILLUMIN, Dec. 27, 2011,
http://illumin.usc.edu/195/american-football-that-magic-yellow-line (explaining how the
yellow line is created); SPORTVISION, http://www.sportvision.com/about.html (last visited July
7, 2011) (providing examples of AR from various sports).
52. For an overview, see generally BARFIELD &0CAUDELL, supra note 9.
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This Part introduces augmented reality and ubiquitous computing technolo-
gies that are changing the economy's information architecture. Although I
hesitate to begin with a technological primer, legal audiences are sometimes
unaware of the rapid advances in and deployment of these technologies. It
is impossible to consider the ramifications of augmented reality for contract
law without understanding the state and pace of technological innovation.
This Part also presents a typology of the information that augmented
reality technologies make available to consumers. This information is ulti-
mately more important than which specific technological delivery method
becomes popular. Put differently, whether we augment our experience of phys-
ical space via an iPhone or digital eyeglasses, for contract it matters most what
information those technologies can transmit to transacting consumers and firms,
and how that information allows consumers and firms to sort and signal at
lower cost.
A. An Introduction to Augmented Reality Technologies
The retinal displays of the Terminator movies53 and the augmented reality
glasses in Minority Report have made for good science fiction, but these
technologies are no longer as futuristic as they seemed even a decade ago.5
This Part explores the history of augmented reality, the state of today's
technologies, and what the near future promises in terms of state-of-the-art
delivery methods.
It is important to stress that today's smartphones are sufficiently
advanced to raise the doctrinal questions at issue in this Article. Put diffe-
rently, further technological advance is not necessary for my argument to
matter-the technologies in today's pockets suffice. Nevertheless-and at the
risk of sounding too much like science fiction-it is worth briefly exploring
the information delivery methods currently available or under development.
53. THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984); TERMINATOR Two: JUDGMENT DAY (TriStar
Pictures 1991); TERMINATOR THREE: RISE OF THE MACHINES (Warner Bros. 2003).
54. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
55. The Terminator series featured augmented reality eyeglasses with sophisticated digital display
technologies, and Minority Report featured a series of augmented reality display technologies.
See supra notes 53-54.
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1. A Brief History
Augmented reality has been developing for decades. In 1968, Ivan
Sutherland created a working prototype of the first augmented reality sys-
tem.5 6  The system consisted of a helmet with a digital display that the user
could wear to look around the room and see digital information overlaid on the
physical world. In the first prototypes, the head-mounted display was so heavy
that it had to be suspended from the ceiling-leading to the system's nickname,
the Sword of Damocles.57
The goal of early experimental systems was to bring digital information
to the user's experience of the physical world. Experimental augmented reality
systems included outdoor navigation systems for the visually impaired;s5 various
backpack-based systems combining head-worn displays, location awareness,
and computational ability;59 guided campus tours using mobile augmented
reality;60 and battlefield information augmentation systems.6' These systems,
developed primarily in the 1990s, seem crude today, but they demonstrated the
potential for using digital information to augment physical experience.62
56. See Ivan E. Sutherland, A Head-Mounted Three-Dimensional Display, PROC. FALL JOINT COMP.
CONF. 757 (1968).
57. See STEPHEN CAWOOD &MARK FIALA, AUGMENTED REALITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 2
(2007) (explaining the origins of the "Sword of Damocles" nickname).
58. See Jack M. Loomis et al., Personal Guidance System for the Visually Impaired Using GPS,
GIS, and VR Technologies, PROC. VIRTUAL REALITY & PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
CONF. (1993).
59. The Tinmith backpacks were early pioneers, as was the Touring Machine. See Steve Feiner et
al., A Touring Machine: Prototyping 3D Mobile Augmented Reality Systems for Exploring the
Urban Environment, PROC. OF THE FIRST IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON WEARABLE COMPUTERS
74 (1997); Bruce H. Thomas et al., A Wearable Computer System With Augmented Reality to
Support Terrestrial Navigation, PROC. OF THE SECOND IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON WEARABLE
COMPUTERS 168 (1998).
60. See, e.g., Tobia Hollerer et al., Situated Documentaries: Embedding Multimedia Presentations in
the Real World, PROC. OF THE THIRD IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON WEARABLE COMPUTERS 79
(1999) (demonstrating an augmented reality system contained in a backpack).
61. See Simon Julier et al., BARS: Battlefield Augmented Reality System, NATO INFO. SYS.
TECHNIQUES SYMP. ON "NEW INFO. PROCESSING TECH. FOR MILITARY SYSTEMS" (2000).
62. They also show the immediate appeal of augmented reality to gamers. See Bruce Thomas
et al., ARQuake: An Outdoor/Indoor Augmented Reality First Person Application, PROC. OF
THE FOURTH INT'L SYMP. ON WEARABLE COMPUTERS 139 (2000) (presenting a system
extending the personal computer game Quake to the physical world for users equipped with
a mobile AR backpack); see also Adrian David Cheok et al., Human Pacman: A SensingBased
Mobile Entertainment System With Ubiquitous Computing and Tangible Interaction, PROC. OF
THE SECOND WORKSHOP ON NETWORK & SYSTEM SUPPORT FOR GAMES 106 (2003)
(presenting interactive outdoor human Pacman game using GPS).
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In addition to this early work on augmented reality display systems, an
intertwined development was occurring simultaneously: the conception and
beginnings of ubiquitous computing. Mark Weiser, a researcher at the Xerox
Palo Alto Research Center, coined the phrase in a brief essay titled "Ubiquitous
Computing #1." In that and other papers, Weiser developed the concept of
"invisible computing" distributed throughout the environment.' Rather than
massive mainframe computers or even desktop computers, Weiser imagined
small, lower-power, but plentiful computers embedded in everyday objects,
capable of networking together to provide information to individuals in a
decentralized manner. As Weiser put it, 'The most profound technologies are
those that disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life
until they are indistinguishable from it."64
Finally, mobile communications technology developed simultaneously
but quite independently. IBM and Bellsouth introduced the first smartphone
in 1992-it served as a phone, calculator, address book, fax machine, and email
device; had one megabyte of memory; and cost nine hundred dollars. 5 The
Global Positioning System (GPS) came online in 1993; the first mobile
phones with GPS and internet connectivity arrived in 1999; and the first com-
mercial camera phone was sold in 2000. Mobile technology advanced and spread
throughout the 2000s, and by 2008, mobile developers were beginning to
present phone-based augmented reality applications. 6
2. Today's Delivery Methods
These developments have come together to augment physical reality
with digital information. In 2010, we entered a new phase of the computer
revolution. Suddenly, most of us carry a device-phone, tablet, or computer-
capable of constant connection to the internet, impressive computational
power, and location awareness.' Our devices know where we are, which direc-
tion we are moving, and what is around us. This not only allows these devices to
63. See GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 11 (providing history).
64. Mark Weiser, The Computer for the 21st Century, 3 MOBILE COMPUTING & COMMUN.
REV. 3, 3 (1999).
65. See IBM Simon, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_(phone) (last modified
Oct. 12, 2011).
66. See, e.g., Daniel Wagner et al., Pose Tracking From Natural Features on Mobile Phones, PROC.
OF THE SEVENTH IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON MIXED &AUGMENTED REALITY 125 (2008).
67. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
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instantly search for information, but also allows for applications that "push""
context-relevant information to us based on our location, our proximity to
other people, our social network, or other criteria. Yelp, 69 Junaio,70 and
Layar7 ' are all examples of popular early augmented reality platforms. An
iPhone, iPad, or Droid user can use these applications to virtually look down a
street and see which restaurants have good reviews,72 what digital information
is available about local landmarksy7 and even which houses belong to registered
sex offenders. 74
These context-aware technologies are increasingly sophisticated. For
example, Layar and Junaio16 recently added object recognition and visual search
capabilities. A user can now point a smartphone at a printed newspaper article
and share the digital version of that article with friends online. Or, customers
of a coffee shop can aim their smartphones at an icon on the menu and instantly
review-or see reviews of-various items.n7  As these technologies continue
to develop, consumers will increasingly have instant access to information
about the products and services around them, without having to search for
it. Instead, such data will be made available as the consumer's augmented
68. Push technologies provide context-relevant information to the user of an augmented reality device
such as a smartphone without the user having to request the information. Push Technology,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push-technology (last modified Jan. 6, 2012).
69. YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited July 7, 2011); see also Ben Parr, Easter Egg: Ye/p Is the
iPhone's First Augmented Reality App, MASHABLE (Aug. 27, 2009), http://mashable.com/
2009/08/27 /yelp-augmented-reality.
70. JUNAIO, http://www.junaio.com (last visited July 10, 2011) (providing an augmented reality
software platform for mobile application developers).
71. LAYAR, http://www.layar.com (last visited July 1, 2011) (providing a "beautiful, fun augmented
reality app that shows you the things you can't see").
72. See id.
73. See WIKITUDE, http://www.wikitude.com (last visited July 1, 2011) (providing an AR
application that layers point of interest information over a smartphone's camera display).
74. See Claudine Beaumont, iPhoneApp Tracks Sex Offenders, TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2009, 9:05 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/5918923/iPhone-app-tracks-sex-offenders.html;
VISION 20/20, http://locator.thevision2020.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
75. See Eric Smalley, Your Phone Will Soon Recognize Things It Sees, CNET (Aug. 30, 2011, 4:33
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20099536-1/your-phone-will-soon-recognize-
things-it-sees (describing Layar's new "visual search" capabilities that allow smartphones to
recognize text, images, objects, barcodes, and QR codes, thereby allowing users to interact with
and learn about objects in their environment).
76. See Kit Eaton, Can Lffe Be as Browsable as the Web? Augmented Reality Outfit Metaio Thinks So,
FAST COMPANY (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/1776893/augmented-reality-
outfit-junaio-aims-at-a-sci-fi-future-with-object-recognition (describing Junaio 3.0, which
includes object, image, and barcode recognition).
77. See Smalley, supra note 75 (describing these features).
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reality device-smartphone, tablet, or otherwise-recognizes products, retrieves
relevant information about those products, and shares that information with
the consumer.
Search is no longer the paradigm. Google's Eric Schmidt has emphatically
asserted that in the near future, search will not be Google's business; rather,
pushing relevant information to users in real time will be more important.'
Already, the majority of some types of Google searches originate on mobile
devices.79  Apple's Steve Jobs heralded the rise of mobile computing and the
decline of the personal computer,8 0 and some expect next generation iPhones to
contain radio frequency identification (RFID) scanners to permit an entirely
new generation of context-sensitive smartphone applications."' Qualcomm-
a leading maker of mobile computing chips-has invested heavily in augmented
reality technologies, and expects these applications to drive smartphone sales
over the next few years.82 Although many first generation applications have
been crude or game-like, technologists understand that the potential of aug-
mented reality is not in whiz-bang visuals but rather in providing consumers
with relevant information in real time-information that in many cases has
never before been available without incurring significant costs.83
78. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Google and the Searchfor the Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2010,
at A9 (quoting Schmidt as saying, "[O]ne idea is that more and more searches are done on your
behalf without you needing to type. I actually think most people don't want Google to answer
their questions.... They want Google to tell them what they should be doing next.").
79. See Joab Jackson, Google: Mobile Map Search Surging Past Desktop Use, COMPUTERWORLD
(May 25, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9217067/GoogleMobile-map-search
surging-past desktop use.
80. See Apple Special Event: June 6, 2011, APPLE, http://events.apple.com.edgesuite.net/11piubpwiqubf
06/event (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (announcing Apple's iCloud service, and discussing the
decline of the personal computer versus mobile devices).
81. See, e.g., Neil Hughes, Bhe ofRFID in Apple' iPhone 5Expected to Have a "Unique" Twist, APPLE
INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2011, 11:50 AM), http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/11/02/17/use-ofrfid
in apples iphone_5_expected to have a unique twist.html (discussing speculation about RFID
in the iPhone 5). The introduction of RFID scanning would provide smartphones with yet
another means to learn about the physical environment near a user. If RFID tags become
commonplace in consumer goods, for example, smartphones could read those tags and push
information to a consumer about the products in the consumer's shopping cart at the grocery
store or on a display in a shopping mall.
82. See Qualcomm Announces Commercial Release of Its Augmented Reality Platform, QUALCOMM
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2011/04/27/qualcomm-announces-
commercial-release-its-augmented-reality-platform.
83. See GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 24-25 ("Maybe ifts easiest simply to describe it as infor-
mation detached from the Web's creaky armature of pages, sites, feeds and browsers, and set free
instead in the wider world to be accessed when, how and where you want it.").
3. Tomorrow's Delivery Methods
In the last few years, these components have come together in millions
of smartphones, tablets, and other devices. As Mike Kuniavsky has argued,
"we are at the beginning of the era of computation and data communication
embedded in, and distributed through, our entire environment."84 Suddenly,
augmented reality has moved out of the laboratory and into the market.
As discussed above, 5 additional developments in delivery methods are
unnecessary for the doctrinal discussion that follows in Parts II and III;
today's smartphones suffice. It is worth pausing, however, to consider briefly
several technologies that exist but are not yet available to consumers. These
delivery methods are truly futuristic, but they illustrate the likely directions
of augmented reality's ongoing evolution. Moreover, they illustrate the impor-
tant point that although today's smartphones already raise questions for contract
law, today's smartphones are not the terminus of augmented reality's devel-
opment. Far from it, today's smartphones are relatively crude augmented
reality devices just beginning to bring digital information to physical space.
Although we cannot predict with accuracy which information technologies
will succeed in the future, we can predict with confidence that these technol-
ogies will continue to develop, become more sophisticated, and provide
consumers with information in more useful, salient, and seamless ways.
Various display technologies under development promise to integrate aug-
mented reality into daily life. For example, several companies are working on
projecting information directly onto car windshields and windows. Recent
innovations include heads up vehicle navigation displays that project maps
and information directly onto the windshield, creating the sensation that driv-
ing directions are on the road in front of the driver. 6  Similarly, Toyota is
developing car windows that give backseat passengers the ability to interact
with the passing outside world by drawing on and querying the window with
their fingers." A child could touch a passing tree, for example, and the window
84. MiKE KUNIAvSKY, SMART THINGS: UBIQUITOUS COMPUTTING USER EXPERIENCE
DESIGN 3 (2010); see also id at 10 ("By 2005. .. the era of ubiquitous computing had begun.").
85. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
86. See Vehicle Displays: Head Up Displays, MICROVISION, http://www.microvision.com/vehicle
displays/head-up-displays.html (last visited July 7, 2011) (demonstrating MicroVision's proposed
consumer heads up display system).
87. See Dave Banks, Toyota's "Window to the World" Offere Backseat Passengers Augmented Reality,
WIRED, July 29, 2011, http://www.wired.coi/geekdad/2011/07/toyotas-window-to-the-
world-offers-backseat-passengers-augmented-reality.
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might display the word "tree" to teach vocabulary, or touch a passing building
to query the window for the building's distance from the car.
Wearable displays are also in development. You can currently purchase ski
goggles that will project GPS and weather information directly to you as you
ski,88 and somewhat odd-looking sunglasses with embedded augmented reality
displays capable of overlaying digital information on your natural field of
view." Various firms are working to develop regular eyeglasses that can
project digital information to their wearer,90 and researchers are even trying to
embed display technologies in contact lenses.91 The ability to access digital
information-email, instant messages, walking or driving directions, lecture
notes, product information, and so on-directly through your eyeglasses
would obviously bring augmented reality to a dramatically different level
than being forced to use your smartphone. Although early prototypes exist, this
technology is not yet consumer-ready.92
Finally, innovators are working on various other delivery methods to
integrate the physical and digital worlds. Consider MIT computer scientist
Pranav Mistry's much lauded SixthSense project.93 SixthSense combines a
smartphone (for location awareness, computation power, and internet connec-
tivity) with a digital camera and small LCD projector that the user wears on
a pendant around the neck. The projector displays text and images onto the
user's physical environment; the user can then interact with these projections
through hand gestures that the camera detects and the smartphone processes.
88. See Paul Ridden, World First GPS Goggles With Head Mounted Display, GIZMAG (Oct. 8,
2010), http://www.gizmag.com/zeal-recon-transcend-gps-head-mounted-display-goggles/16605.
89. See VUZIX, http://www.vuzix.com/consumer/products-wrap920ar.html (last visited
July 7, 2011) (selling the Wrap 920AR glasses).
90. Early versions of eyeglass displays are now available; prototypes of future systems show the
direction that leading firms are exploring. See Wearable Displays: Mobile Device Eyewear,
MICROVISION, http://www.microvision.com/wearable-displays/mobile.html (last visited
July 7, 2011) (providing examples of eyewear prototypes); see also 3D Display System, NIT
DOCOMO, http://www.nttdocomo.com/technologies/future/3D/index.html (last visited July
7, 2011) (providing examples of Docomo's eyeglass prototypes).
91. See Babak A. Parviz, For Your Eye Only: A New Generation of Contact Lenses Built With Very
Small Circuits and LEDs Promises Bionic Eyesight, IEEE SPECTRUM, Sept. 2009, at 36
(describing contact lens research).
92. See Yohan Baillot & Christine Perey, Position Paper, Int'l AR Standards Meeting, AR Eyewear
and Mobile Devices: The Challenges Ahead (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.perey.com/
ARStandards/Baillot-Perey-AREyewear andMobileDevices.pdf (discussing challenges of
developing augmented reality eyewear).
93. See About, SIXTHSENSE, http://www.pranavmistry.com/projects/sixthsense (last visited June
13, 2011) (describing SixthSense and providing videos of its user interface).
694 59 UCLA L. REV. 676 (2012)
In combination, these simple technologies allow SixthSense to create stunning
applications. If a user picks up a book in a bookstore, SixthSense scans the
cover, detects what book it is, and then projects book reviews or price com-
parison information directly onto the cover of the book using the LCD
projector.9 Similarly, if a user holds a product in a grocery store-such as a
roll of paper towels-SixthSense can augment that physical object with infor-
mation about its environmental qualities (for example, by projecting onto the
paper towels a red, yellow, or green icon indicating how "green" the towels
are). 95 The system can identify people using facial recognition and project digi-
tal nametags onto their chests as they approach. Finally, SixthSense can project
a video or other multimedia content onto the physical world. For example, a
newspaper reader can point at a story and see a video related to that story
projected directly onto the newspaper-or a consumer reading a contract can
see a video explaining that contract. 6
The digital magic wand or point-to-discover (P2D) project provides
another example of future AR technology.97 P2D is a handheld device that
connects wirelessly to a smartphone. If the user points the wand at an object or
location in the physical world, this cues the smartphone to provide information
about that object or location. For example, you might point at a restaurant and
immediately retrieve information about and ratings for that restaurant; point at a
bus stop to learn when the next bus will arrive; or point at a building to learn
its history or retrieve a directory of its merchants. The goal, as with the goal of
all augmented reality technologies, is to more closely and seamlessly integrate
digital information into physical space.
B. Sorting and Signaling Across Information Types
Having succumbed to the temptation to peer into the (near) future, let us
return to more humble topics. Before turning, in Parts II and III, to the impact
these technologies may have on contract doctrine, this Subpart categorizes the




97. See Overview, POINT To DISCOVER, http://p2d.ftw.at (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (explaining
the Point-to-Discover research project). For an overview of such developments, see Peter
Fr6hlich et al., On the Move, Wirelessly Connected to the World, 54 COMM. ACM VIRTUAL
EXTENSION, Jan. 2011, at 132 (discussing mobile spatial interaction research).
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rather than reviewing the technologies themselves-the glasses or contact
lenses or heads up displays-consider briefly a typology of the information
those technologies can now transmit to each of us, and the ways those technol-
ogies change the ability of consumers and firms to sort and signal each other as
they contract.
1. Places
Over the past year, location-based applications for smartphones have proli-
ferated. These devices increasingly contain GPS technology to provide location
awareness, and, combined with internet connectivity, this permits smartphones
to provide location-relevant information about the places we visit.
Early and simple examples include museum and city walking tours;
information about nearby restaurants or other retail establishments; and directions
to movies or the nearest ATM machine.98 But location-sensitive information
can also have more profound implications for contracting. The popular website
Zillow, for example, aggregates publicly available information to display price
information about almost every house in the United States; this information
is now available on smartphones as well. You can point your iPhone down a
street and see, on a map, prices overlaid on each house." Various companies are
layering more and more information into such maps. This includes displays of
criminal activity in the arealoo or quality ratings of neighborhood schools.' 0'
This sort of information could be of obvious import in real estate transactions. 1 02
In addition, as discussed above in the context of Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co.,'s consumers can now easily augment physical locations with
98. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing examples of such applications).
99. See ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com (last visited July 5, 2011).
100. See CRIME MAPPING, http://www.crimemapping.com (last visited July 27, 2011) (providing
map overlays of police reports about criminal activity for a variety of U.S. cities).
101. See, e.g., Fixing D.C's Schoot, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/
interactives/dcschools/scorecard.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (providing an interactive map
showing school ratings, percentage of classes taught by highly qualified teachers, crime
incidents, health inspection violations, and delay in repairs for city schools).
102. Such information can impact disclosure and misrepresentation, for example. See, e.g., Reed v.
King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a seller's failure to disclose that
a family was murdered in the house several years earlier was a material fact affecting the value
of the property).
103. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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digital information.104 The mobile application Foursquare, for example, allows
a user to review a retailer or restaurant and to leave that review for other users
that enter that particular physical location.' Google has recently acquired
patents on similar location-based virtual note technologies.' 06 These technol-
ogies allow consumers to communicate with and learn from each other in
entirely new ways. In the analog world, you might have learned about a good
restaurant or a bad merchant if you happened to talk with a friend who had
personal experience with that retailer. In an augmented reality, however, you
can now learn from your social network or from the universe of strangers who
have visited that retailer, just by visiting the retailer and seeing information
tagged to that location. This makes a merchant's entire reputation available to
each consumer that enters the store, thereby dramatically lowering the cost for
consumers to sort merchants and determine with which merchants to transact.
It is hard to overstate the radical nature of this shift to ubiquitous location-
based information. In the traditional or analog economy, consumers had few
ways to search for information about a given merchant. The owners of your
favorite local breakfast spot, for example, have always known about the restau-
rant's food quality and record of health code violations, but a potential customer
standing outside on the sidewalk could not access this information. As with all
sorting problems,'07 consumers were thus forced to sort merchants by relying on
imperfect proxies. Merchants would try to signal their quality to consumers by
investing in the architecture or furnishings in their stores, through expensive
advertising, or through branding. In an augmented reality, consumers can access
other consumer reviews indexed by location, giving them entirely new ways to
sort their contracting partners.
104. Various applications allow consumers to leave digital notes connected to a physical location.
See, e.g., STIKINOTES, http://www.stikinotes.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (allowing
consumers to leave digital location-based notes for each other).
105. Foursquare is a very popular electronic check-in service that allows consumers to check into a
location via their cellular phones. See FOURSQUARE, http://www.foursquare.com (last visited
June 2, 2011).
106. Google recently acquired Xybernaut Corp., one of the early patent-holders on location-based
virtual note technologies. See Bill Slawski, GoogleAcquires VirtualPost-lt Notes Patents, SEO BY
THE SEA (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://www.seobythesea.com2011/03/google-acquires-
virtual-post-it-notes-patents.
107. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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2. Goods
In addition to information about places, we can now instantly access a
great deal of information about goods. Two points are relevant here. First,
information about goods is increasingly available through mobile computing.
Second, the quantity and quality of information about goods are exploding, as
goods become connected to the internet and become capable of recording and
transmitting vast stores of information about themselves.
First, consider accessibility. Goods possess what some in design call an
"information shadow."0 8 A good's information shadow is the composite of all
of the available information about it-its origins, makeup, and manufac-
turer; market information about its price; consumer and professional reviews of
its quality and performance; government safety information; and any other
relevant information.
Goods have always had such a shadow, but in an analog world it was cost-
prohibitive to search for and to use such information. You might have talked
to a friend about which car to buy, but it was impossible to collect reviews
from hundreds of acquaintances. "The complexity of finding, organizing, and
accessing this information divided the world of objects and the world of
information shadows."' 9 At the start of the digital era, goods largely remained
divorced from their information shadows. "Even if accessible through a
computer, information shadows were unavailable when they could provide the
most value: in choosing between different products to buy, or in figuring out
how to use a new tool.""10
Mobile computing increasingly makes a good's information shadow
instantly accessible from anywhere. As mentioned, smartphones can now scan
an object's bar code to pull up reviews of that product. The iPhone applica-
tion Fooducate allows you to scan the bar code of one of over 200,000 food
products and learn the complete nutritional information about that food.1
Almost half of Android and iPhone users have scanned a barcode with their
phones; nearly a quarter have scanned an image of a product to search for
108. See KUNIAVSKY, supra note 84, at 72 ("The digitally accessible information about an object can
be called its information shadow.").
109. Id.
110. Id
111. See FOODUCATE, http://wxvw.fooducate.com (last visited July 14, 2011).
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information about that product.112  Moreover, preliminary research seems to
suggest that consumers prefer-and may even be willing to pay for-the ability
to access product information and reviews while shopping in physical space."3
As databases of information about goods become more organized, complete,
and available, consumers will increasingly have access to the information
shadows of the objects with which they interact or that they wish to purchase
in the physical world.
Second, goods can now signal to consumers in entirely new ways. This is
as important as consumers being able to sort high-quality from low-quality
goods by accessing digital information. Shoes,114 refrigerators," 5 wine bottles,"6
car tires,"' and even cattle"8 can now record relevant data about themselves
and report such data electronically to consumers. 1' 9 This is the "Internet of
Things" -a120 connected web of "smart" objects capable of generating and
transmitting data on themselves. Consider these startling statistics: In 2008, there
were more objects connected to the internet than there were people on
Earth; in 2011, just twenty typical American households generated as much
internet traffic as the entire internet in 2008, in part because of the increasing
112. See Dan Butcher, Mobile Bar Code Scanning Has Become Mainstream: Survey, MOBILE
COMMERCE DAILY (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/2011/01/20/
mobile-bar-code-scanning-has-become-mainstream-survey (providing statistics on scanning via
various smartphone platforms).
113. See Tobias Kowatsch et al., The Role ofProduct Reviews on Mobile Devices for In-Store Purchases:
Consumers' Usage Intentions, Costs and Store Preferences, 6 INT'L J. INTERNET MARKETING
& ADVERTISING 226, 235-36, 239-40 (2011) (finding that consumers may be willing to
pay between 2 and 5 percent of a product's cost to have access to reviews of that product).
114. See Xsens ForceShoe, XSENS, http://www.xsens.com/en/general/forceshoe (last visited July 30,
2011) (introducing a sensor-filled shoe capable of measuring gait, torque, and other kinematics
of the foot).
115. See Suzanne Kantra, Are You Ready for a Smart Fridge, DIGITAL LIFE ON TODAY (May 2,
2011, 7:46 AM), http://digitallife.today.com/_news/2011/05/02/6557879-are-you-ready-for-a-
smart-fridge (discussing refrigerator models capable of detecting the food inside and monitoring
food "sell by" dates).
116. See EPROVENANCE, http://www.eprovenance.com (last visited July 10, 2011) (offering RFID
solutions to track the temperature and care of wine).
117. See Nilay Patel, Pirelli Cyber Tire Adds Some Smarts to Your Slicks, ENGADGET (Aug. 28, 2008,
8:28 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2008/08/28/pirelli-cyber-tire-adds-some-smarts-to-your-
slicks (discussing the Cyber Tire, which can record pressure, temperature, and vehicle load).
118. See Dave Evans, The Internet of Things, PLATFORM (July 15, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.cisco.
con/news/the-internet-of-things-infographic (discussing a Dutch startup named Sparked that
allows farmers to track cattle wirelessly).
119. See GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 18-23 (providing examples of digitally connected objects).
120. The term "Internet of Things" was coined at the MIT Auto-ID Center in 1999. See KUNIAVSKY,
supra note 84, at 79.
number of connected devices; and by 2020, there will be 50 billion internet-
enabled objects.121
The ability of goods to share information with consumers is, again, a
radical change. As one recent ubiquitous computing study put it:
Smart products-products that share information with
consumers-are designed to combine the online and offline
world.... Whereas today's in-store products provide only static
information, future smart products may provide information about
their journey to their current location (e.g. multiple countries of
origin), information about their ingredients (e.g. news articles on
problems with a particular supplier) and possibly some embedded
intelligence. . . (e.g. the types of difficulties others have had [with]
the product).... Benefits for consumers could be: First, in terms
of search, the user should be able to quickly discover available online
information, e.g., comparable products plus rich descriptions of its
use and limits; [iln terms of experience, the user should be able to
learn from others how well-liked the product was, how long it lasted,
etc.; and in terms of credence, the user should be able to find out
how the company treated returns, failures, etc. These benefits could
make purchase decisions easier. 122
Essentially, these technologies allow goods to signal quality to consumers in
new ways.
Consider automobiles. Cars have long had unique identifiers or VINs.
Until recently, however, searching for information based on a VIN was
relatively difficult. Today, Carfax.com 23 allows you to search based on a VIN
and learn the vehicle's owner history, mileage, recall information, and warranty
information. It will also report whether the vehicle has ever been in a flood or
seriously damaged in an accident, whether its airbags have deployed, or whether
it has ever been branded a lemon under state lemon laws.124
Cars are acquiring the ability to transmit this information to consumers
directly, rather than through an intermediary like CarFax. Some project that
cars will increasingly be equipped with RFID or other technologies that will
121. See Evans, supra note 118.
122. Florian Resatsch et al., Do Point of Sale RFID Based Information Services Make a Difference?:
Analyzing Consumer Perceptions for Designing Smart Product Information Services in Retail
Business, 18 ELECTRONIC MARKETS 216, 218 (2008).
123. See CARFAX, http://www.carfax.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
124. See CARFAX LEMON CHECK, supra note 2.
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allow them to broadcast information to nearby consumers.125 Manufactur-
ers are already realizing the power of allowing cars to speak for themselves.
Nissan, for example, has begun labeling cars with QR codes that consumers
may scan to access information about the vehicle's make, model, and
features. As these signaling technologies evolve, goods will be able to share far
more information about themselves-including difficult-to-fake signals of
quality, such as repair history.
The same is true of many other goods for which such information might
prove valuable. Among consumer goods, computers, appliances, cameras, and
other high-value electronics come to mind. Beyond the consumer realm, all
forms of commercial, agricultural, and industrial machinery are obvious
candidates. Goods are increasingly smart, and information about smart goods
is increasingly available to augment our interactions with the physical world.
3. People and Firms
People and firms also have information shadows-a digital self that
augments the physical self. Consumers and firms can increasingly learn
about each other prior to transacting by accessing these information shadows.
Consider reputation. A person's reputation is just a Google search away.126
Moreover, the internet has generated new user-generated reputation ranking
systems. For example, eBay posts reputational measures of honesty for its
buyers and sellers. 127 Firms, too, have discovered that their virtual reputations
are at least as important as their traditional, word-of-mouth reputations.128
Public report cards for doctors and hospitals are being touted as a means to
correct an ailing health care system. 129 And rating sites-in which homeowners
rate contractors, electricians, or plumbers;130 clients rate lawyers; 131 students
125. See Adam Blum, NFC and the Internet of Things, VENTUREBEAT (June 21, 2011),
http://www.venturebeat.com/2011/06/21/nfc-and-the-internet-of-things ("[A]ll cars will have
[near field communications] tags embedded, containing specifications, statistics and web links
for more information on the vehicle.").
126. See, e.g., Diane Coutu et al., We Googled You Should Fred Hire Mimi Despite Her Online History,
HIARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at 37, 40 ("Google anyone hard enough, and you'll find some dirt.").
127. See EBAY, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
128. See, e.g., Nicholas Thompson, More Companies Pay Heed to Their 'Word of Mouse' Reputation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, at C4.
129. See HEALTHGRADES, http://www.healthgrades.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
130. See ANGIE'S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
131. See Avvo, http://www.avvo.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011); MARTINDALE.COM,
http://www.martindale.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
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rate professors;132 tenants rate landlords;133 and consumers rate brands and
manufacturers13 4-now provide the public with heretofore delayed, disag-
gregated, or nonexistent data about reputation.
Lior Strahilevitz calls the increased availability of reputational information
the "reputation revolution"135 and argues that these technologies will create
profound changes in law and public policy. In particular, Strahilevitz focuses
on the ways in which reputational technologies can influence our regulation of
discriminatory practices. 3 6 In addition to these social or policy implications,
digital reputations play a role in contracting by permitting consumers and firms
to sort reputable from disreputable contracting partners.
We have already seen examples of consumers learning about firms through
online consumer and intermediary reviews of locations and goods, and the next
Subpart-on contract terms-provides more evidence of the ways in which
such information changes the sorting process for consumers. Augmented reality
also changes sorting and signaling for firms learning about consumers. As
already discussed, facial recognition technologies are now available, rather than
just being the stuff of science fiction.137 We can also identify others by the elec-
tronic devices they carry or by biometric markers, such as iris scanning.138 As
these technologies evolve and integrate into the economy, firms will increasingly
be able to identify consumers individually. As Jerry Kang has put it:
[E]nvision a future where we can "right click" on any object. . . and
receive contextually relevant information. People already "Google"
each other before going on dates or to interviews. Think about hav-
ing the option of one-click "Googling" anyone you walk past, as you
walk past.. .. This process could become automated; no specific
"request" to pull information will be required. Rather, software will
manage our datasense and constantly seek out and filter information
about nearby people.139
132. See RATE MY PROFESSORS, http://www.ratemyprofessors.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
133. See APARTMENT RATINGS, http://www.apartmentratings.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
134. See EPINIONS, http://www.epinions.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
135. See Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note 31, at 5.
136. See Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving," supra note 31, at 1702 ("[This Article] explores the use of
information aggregation technologies to deter, detect, and punish citizen misconduct.").
137. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
138. See Julia Angwin, Iris Recognition: The New Fingerprinting?, DIGITS (July 13, 2011,
11:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/iris-recognition-the-new-fingerprinting
(discussing improvements in iris recognition technologies).
139. Kang & Cuff, supra note 31, at 110.
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Beyond focusing on reputation, scholars have focused on the ways in which
firms sort consumers by mining aggregated data, such as credit histories. The
privacy field is dominated by Daniel Solove's concept of the "digital dossier," for
example, which is a metaphor for the aggregate of information available in public
and private databases about a given person.140 Data aggregators now possess
huge amounts of information about each of us: Corporate data mining links at
least seven thousand transactions to each individual in the United States per
year-approximately half a million transactions over one's lifetime. 14 1  In a
world in which firms can identify consumers-as Acquisti's study shows they
increasingly canl42 -firms can link consumers to these digital dossiers and thereby
acquire detailed profiles on the interests, habits, income levels, and shopping
patterns of those that walk through their doors.
4. Contract Terms
Finally, in addition to having information about places, goods, people,
and firms, consumers increasingly have ubiquitous mobile access to information
about contract terms.
Various websites allow consumers to share information, including reviews
and complaints related to contract terms. For example, pissedconsumer.com,
complaintsboard.com, ripoffreport.com, complaints.com, consumeraffairs.com,
scamfound.com, and others host thousands of consumer comments about
contracting problems. Consider just a few examples. On March 20, 2011, a
reviewer posted under the subject heading "Never Never Sign a Contract with
Dish Network":
According to Dish TV customer service. .. their contract allows them
to raise their rate every year if the [sic] want to[]. WAHAT????? I
cannot find my original contract to dispute this but this is a shady
underhanded way or [sic] strong arming extra money out of their
140. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1-2 (2004) (defining the digital dossier).
141. Jason Millar, Core Privacy: A Problem for Predictive Data Mining, in LESSONS FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 103,
105 (lan Kerr et al. eds., 2009).
142. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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customers who are stuck in a contract.... DO NOT EVER sign a
contract with Dish TV.... 143
Or consider this May 28, 2011, review titled "Beware of Contract Fine Print":
MassageEnvy-a massage spa that provides a discount rate for
monthly massages with a one-year minimum membership. If you
decide to cancel, please be aware that you must give 30 days notice in
writing and your membership continues during that time. So
basically you need to visit the MassageEnvy spa exactly 30 days before
the end of your membership or otherwise you get charged another
monthly credit.144
Thousands of similar reviews contain exerted complaints about consumers
being locked into contracts for longer than expected, 145 excessive cancellation
fees, 14 6 and contract terms that mislead consumers about expected benefits or
contract coverage.147
In many cases, multiple consumers have complained about the contract
of a given merchant or product. These negative reviews are easy to find. For
example, a Google search for "Anytime Fitness" brings up negative reviews in
the top five search results.148 A search for "Anytime fitness contract complaints"
brings up complaints posted on pissedconsumer.com, complaintsboard.com,
ripoffreport.com, consumercomplaints.com, my3cents.com, scamfound.com, the
Better Business Bureau, and a variety of geographically-based consumer
complaint sites.149 A search for the same terms on pissedconsumer.com returns
almost two hundred negative reviews, many of which have been viewed
143. Never Never Sign a Contract With Dish Network, PISSED CONSUMER (Mar. 20, 2011),
http://dish-network.pissedconsumer.com/never-never-sign-a-contract-with-dish-network-20110
320227723.html.
144. Beware of Contract Fine Print, PISSED CONSUMER (May 28, 2011), http://massage-
envy.pissedconsumer.com/beware-of-contract-fine-print-20110528240139.html.
145. See, e.g., ProtectAmeica [sic] Lied of Length of Contract, PISSED CONSUMER (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://protect-america.pissedconsumer.com/protect-ameica-lied-of-length-of-contract-20110801
252674.html.
146. See, e.g., Rf sal to Cancel a Contract: Life Alert Complaint, PISSED CONSUMER (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://life-alert.pissedconsumer.com/refusal-to-cancel-a-contract-20110331229880.html.
147. See, e.g., Misleading Contract/Hidden and Surprise Fees, PISSED CONSUMER (May 29,
2011), http://adt.pissedconsumer.com/misleading-contract-hidden-and-surprise-fees-20110529
240312.html (complaining that a security system contract excluded monitoring of glass
breakage and contained hidden permit fees).
148. See GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search tenms "Anytime Fitness") (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
149. Id (search terms "Anytime Fitness contract complaints") (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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thousands of times by searching consumers."so Pissed Consumer indexes and
sorts these reviews as well as aggregates the ratings to give Anytime Fitness a
"Five Red Star" score.1s1
In addition to providing such consumer reviews, intermediaries provide
rankings of consumer goods and services that include scores related to contract
terms. J.D. Power & Associates, for example, maintains a website that provides
consumer information about a variety of products. On the website, J.D. Power
ranks credit cards based on their contractual terms, allocating scores from
"among the best" to "the rest."152 Other sites provide similar rankings of credit
card contract terms.' 53 Sites rate other types of contract terms as well, including
health care plans, insurance contracts, airline frequent flyer clubs,154 automobile
manufacturer warranties,155 and computer warranties.156
It is difficult to judge the quality of such consumer and intermediary
reviews, but it is easy to assess their quantity: The past few years have witnessed
an explosion of contract-related information on review sites. At least for large
firms and popular products, a consumer looking for information about a
merchant's contracts need only do a simple Google search.
Information about contract terms will likely increase over time in both
quantity and quality. Augmented reality delivery methods make it more conve-
nient and less costly for consumers to access such information, which will
increase demand. Consumers can search for contract information on their
smartphones. In addition, however, the newest mobile applications use loca-
tion information to push such information to users without requiring them
to search for it."' And some apps-such as SearchReview's mobile platform-
aggregate consumer reviews from thousands of websites, thereby providing a
much-simplified consumer search experience.1ss
150. See Anytime Fitness, PISSED CONSUMER, http://anytime-fitness.pissedconsumer.com (last
visited July 5, 2011).
151. Id.
152. See Credit Card Ratings, J.D. POWER, http://www.jdpower.com/Finance/ratings/credit-card-
ratings (last visited July 7, 2011).
153. See, e.g., CARDRATINGs.COM, http://www.cardratings.com (last visited July 1, 2011).
154. See, e.g., WEBFLYER, http://www.webflyer.com (last visited July 1, 2011).
155. See CARS.COM, http://www.cars.com (last visited July 1, 2011).
156. See CLEARANCE CLUB, http://www.dearanceclub.com (last visited July 1, 2011).
157. See, e.g., BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, supra note 12 (providing reviews of local businesses
based on location information).
158. See SEARCHREVIEWS, http://www.searchreviews.com (last visited July 5, 2011) (aggregating
40 million reviews from over a thousand websites).
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In addition, mobile computing technologies make it much easier for
consumers to supply information by creating reviews on their mobile devices.
The popular website The Consumerist, for example, built a "Consumer
Tipster" feature into its mobile application for the iPhone.'5 9 According
to The Consumerist, this is a "free, fun, and simple way to tell the editors of
Consumerist.com about any scams, rip-offs [or] shoddy products .... Use
the Tipster app to snap a quick picture of the offending item, write up your
comment, and submit to The Consumerist."'60 The Better Business Bureau's
mobile application has a similar feedback feature,16 1 as does Pissed Consumer's
iPhone platform. 62 Thus, augmented reality technologies not only allow
customers to access information about products and contract terms, but also
encourage them to generate and disseminate that information. This Article
now turns to exploring how this explosion of accessible information interacts
with consumer contract doctrine.
II. THE EFFECTS ON ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ARGUMENTS
FOR DISTRUSTING CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Part I explored augmented reality technologies, the types of information
those technologies can now make available to contracting parties, and some
of the ways in which such information permits new forms of low-cost sorting
and signaling. Each of those types of information-about places, goods,
people, firms, and contract terms-has been available before, but often at
significant cost. Today, this data is more accessible, more often, and to more
people. The information infrastructure of the economy has shifted underneath
the feet of contract doctrine. This Part considers the implications of that shift.
In the consumer context, we hesitate to enforce contracts as written either
because of information asymmetries that create market failure or because of
doubts about the parties' capacity to contract.163 This Part focuses on the first
159. See Consumer Titer by Consumer Reports, ITUNES APP STORE, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/
consumerist-tipster/id443045014?mt= 8 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
160. Id.
161. See BBB Search by Council ofBetter Business Bureaus, ITUNES APP STORE, http://itunes.apple.com/
us/app/bbb-search-find-local-businesses/id440014505?mt= 8 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
162. See PISSED CONSUMER, supra note 25.
163. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Recent contracts scholarship has begun to articulate a new and somewhat different concern
about standard form contracts: that firms may include seemingly inefficient terms in such
contracts as a means to differentiate between different types of consumers. See, e.g., Jonathan
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of these two justifications for limiting traditional freedom of contract: the
class of cases in which information-related market failures make a transaction
suspect by dampening competition in the market for the terms in question and
thereby creating opportunity for exploitative terms.164 In these cases, we
intervene to police contracts because we distrust that individual choice will
maximize welfare. 6s Standard form contracts between firms and consumers-
like those at issue in Walker-Thomas-are the best example.
After reviewing the arguments for and against judicial distrust of consumer
contracts, this Part considers the primary effects that augmented reality
will have on this debate. Ultimately, it concludes that an augmented reality will
Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 560-64 (2005) (offering a hypothesis about standard form contracts
as a price discrimination mechanism); see also David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of
Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation
of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 988-1003 (2006); Jason
Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts
Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006).
Although there is insufficient space to address these discriminatory contracting arguments
in this Article, I cannot resist adding a note that augmented reality technologies might impact
such arguments. In particular, it seems likely that if sellers can directly identify consumers-
through facial recognition or other biometric means, for example-then sellers are unlikely to
need to engage in discriminatory contracting to sort classes of consumers. Other, more direct
data will be available to sellers to price-discriminate, at least in some cases. Put differently, if
augmented reality erodes consumers' anonymity, discriminatory contracting will become an
unnecessary contractual complication.
The normative valence of this argument is unclear. On the one hand, contracts may
become simpler and easier to understand if firms do not overly complicate contractual terms to
serve this discriminatory function. This may suggest, again, that standard form contracts will
more likely be enforced as written in an augmented reality. On the other hand, of course, some
may doubt that discriminatory contracting-offering different contracts to different consumers
or groups of consumers-is socially optimal, even if it is welfare-enhancing for particular firms or
individual consumers.
This discussion is, ultimately, yet another application of the increased availability, and
decreased cost, of sorting and signaling. As these costs go down, firms can sort consumers in new
ways, thus making discriminatory contracting possible without the need to use the contract itself
as a proxy for a consumer's type. In addition, consumers will be able to signal to firms in
new ways-something heretofore not considered in this literature. Certain consumers may want
their type known to firms, so that they can reap economic benefit by inducing firms to offer them
special terms. For now, these arguments will have to wait for another day.
164. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 102-46 (1993)
(discussing information-related limits on freedom of contract). For a useful overview, see Shmuel
I. Becher, Asy m metric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45
AM. Bus. L.J. 723, 725-35 (2008) (reviewing literature on information asymmetries and
standard form contracts).
165. See Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 34, § 2.3.2 (discussing asymmetric information as a
justification for limiting freedom of contract).
force both judges and scholars to take account of the ways in which digital
information is now available to consumers in bricks-and-mortar transactions,
and that this convergence of physical and digital space in an augmented
reality will create doctrinal pressure to defer to contracts as written. Whether
a contracting party has access to a smartphone (or some other augmented reality
device) may be-or may become-an important element in determining that
party's contractual rights and obligations.' 6
A. Information Asymmetries and Freedom of Contract
Classical contract law assumed that contracting parties were best posi-
tioned to arrange their affairs and that judicial intervention into those affairs
was largely unwarranted.' 7 These assumptions aligned with basic welfare eco-
nomics, which posits that informed parties will reach efficient agreements under
optimal conditions.'6 8 Over the last century, however, the traditional tendency
to enforce contracts as written has been under attack-particularly in the
context of standard form consumer contracts.' 6  Courts and consumer advo-
cates are suspicious of such "adhesion contracts,""' assuming that they contain
one-sided, pro-seller terms harmful to consumers."' As a result, modern courts
166. As discussed above, see supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text, smartphones merely represent
the current state of technological development augmenting physical space with digital infor-
mation. Future innovations will augment reality in new ways, some of which we can predict
and some of which we cannot. My references to smartphones in Parts II and III should thus
be taken as placeholders for "smartphones or other future augmented reality technologies,
including tablets, heads up displays, or other ubiquitous, embedded innovations."
167. The classical Willistonian view emphasized formalist ideas of freedom of contract as enforcing
agreements as written. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 43 (1974)
(characterizing the Willistonian view); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59
(2004) (defining freedom of contract as "the idea, fundamental in the orthodox understanding of
contract law, that the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law").
168. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
169. See Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 498 (2004) ("As is well known to both students and scholars of contract
law,... for the past one hundred years . . . the historical trend. . . has been to water down . . . formal
doctrines in favor of a more all-things-considered analysis of what the parties may have meant in
the individual case."); see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT
LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW
125-71 (1997) (exploring the history of contextualist reforms in contract law).
170. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (coining the term); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983).
171. See Johnston, supra note 163, at 861 ("By the 19 7 0s, both courts and commentators had
reached a virtual consensus regarding the evil of form contracts.").
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are more likely than their classical predecessors to question, alter, or reject a
contract's written terms on grounds of unconscionability or unfair surprise.' 72
1. The Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts
By the late 1970s, however, law and economics scholars began to argue
that suspicion of standard form contracts might be misguided, even in consumer
contracts. Standardized terms create efficiencies by reducing transaction costs-
bargaining over every contract would be overly cumbersome.173 Moreover, even
if most consumers never read standard form contracts (thereby tempting sellers
to include abusive terms), a relatively small cadre of sophisticated and vigilant
consumers might suffice to force sellers to include only moderate, efficient terms
in their contracts.174  So long as this informed minority creates competitive
pressure,175 merchants will offer consumers efficient terms because failure to do
so would result in consumers taking their business elsewhere.' 7 ' As Michael
Trebilcock has put it:
To the extent that there is a margin of informed, sophisticated, and
aggressive consumers in any given market, who understand the terms
of the standard form contracts on offer and who either negotiate over
those terms or switch their business readily to competing suppliers
172. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1,
8-9 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) ("The decline of formalism has plausibly weakened.. . the security
of exchange in contract law-the expectation that promises made in a contractual setting
will be enforced. The excuses which promisors may invoke to excuse performance, such as
unconscionability. . . are much broader in scope today than they were in the nineteenth
century."); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise ofNeoformalism, 71 FORDHAM
L. REv. 869, 881 (2002) ("The rejection of formalism is pervasive in the new contract law.");
Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 374 (2004) ("The
upshot is this: While state enforcement and interpretation under classical contract law is relatively
formal or 'rule-like' (hard to obtain but, once liability attaches, equally hard to escape), contractual
liability under the new contract law is context-specific or 'standard-like' (easy to impose liability
in any particular situation, but equally easy to escape it).").
173. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 36, at 302-04 (explaining these justifications).
174. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1450-52 (1983) (providing
this argument about standard form contracts).
175. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 133, 174-75 (2010).
176. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 36, at 303 ("The relevant question is whether a market is
competitive or monopolistic. The fact that a contract was made on a standard form does not
establish a presumption in either direction."); David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of
Tmsts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1691 (2009) ("[A]ny attempt to set aside a for m clause
must explain why sellers lack incentives to draft the clause to mirror consumers' predilections.").
offering more favourable terms, they may in effect discipline the entire
market, so that inframarginal (less well informed, sophisticated, or
mobile) consumers can effectively free-ride on the discipline
brought to the market by the marginal consumers, although there
is the potential for a collective action problem if every consumer
attempts to free-ride on the efforts of others in effective monitoring
of contract terms.177
Put differently, if consumers have sufficient information to compare terms
across different suppliers' contracts, suppliers will have reason to provide effi-
cient contracts without unreasonable terms. 78
"New formalism,"179 or neoformalism, thus uses law and economics to
re-justify enforcing contracts as written.1"o Some neoformalists have confined
their arguments to commercial contracting contexts,"' but many of these scholars
also doubt the utility or necessity of judicial policing of consumer contracts.
Economically, such intervention is only justified when one of two conditions
holds: Either the seller has monopoly power and thus has the ability to impose
burdensome and inefficient terms, or there is no likelihood that consumers can or
will inform themselves about such terms in a standard form contract. 82 Absent
such market failure, judicial intervention-for unconscionability' and even for
177. TREBILCOCK, supra note 164, at 120 (citations omitted).
178. See Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131,
136-37 (2008) (arguing that suppliers will provide efficient terms when consumers are informed).
179. See generally David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999).
180. See Katz, supra note 169, at 499-500 (discussing new formalism).
181. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1475, 1477-80 (2010) (arguing that commercial parties systematically choose New
York law to govern their contracts; that New York law tends towards more formalist, strict
construction of contracts; and that this supports Schwartz and Scott's model); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543
(limiting their theory to contracts between relatively sophisticated firms).
182. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis oflmpefect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 666-82 (1979) (making
this argument); see alo Richard A. Epstein, The NeoclassicalEconomics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 803, 804-05 (2008) ('There are ... two sets of. . . circumstances in which the
neoclassical theory accepts that some government intervention may make sense: private monopoly
and imperfect information."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:
Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 595 (1990) ("[I]nefficient
transactions occur because consumers do not read form contracts, or do not understand the terms,
and are thus unaware of their contents.").
183. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 63 (1993) ("[M]ost economists conclude that contracts should
be overridden only if there is some 'market failure' which prevents [an efficient] outcome from
710 59 UCLA L. REV. 676 (2012)
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fraudl 84-is unjustified. So long as markets and parties are reasonably
informed, freedom of contract should prevail.'s As Richard Posner has put it,
"what is important is not whether there is haggling in every transaction but
whether competition forces sellers to incorporate in their standard contracts
terms that protect the purchasers."186
This argument's force, of course, turns on the empirical claim that a
sufficient number of consumers can and will adequately inform themselves to
police standard form contracts and create market discipline.'"' The debate turns
on information.'"' The question is whether consumers learn sufficiently to dis-
cipline sellers, either through their own direct experiences with a given seller
or product, from friends or other consumers, or from third-party intermediary
information providers.189
being realized."); id. at 49 (arguing that courts should intervene in imperfect markets only when
they are in a better position to select efficient terms).
184. Fraud is most likely in transactions about which little information is independently available
ex ante. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 658, 720
(1985). Put differently, fraud is most likely in transactions involving "experience" and "credence"
goods and least likely in transactions involving "search" goods. See Meyerson, supra note
182, at 597 ("Deception is. . . most likely to involve credence qualities, or experience qualities of
infrequently purchased goods."). Thus, as increased information should lead to fewer uncon-
scionable terms, increased information should lead to fewer instances of fraud.
185. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 36, at 231 ("The farther the facts depart from the ideal of
perfect rationality and zero transaction costs, the stronger the case for judges' regulating the
terms of the contract by law.").
186. POSNER, supra note 34, at 144. For a different argument-that standard form contracts may
be efficient even if they contain one-sided, pro-seller terms, see Johnston, supra note 163, at 878
(arguing that such one-sided terms allow sellers to bargain with consumers after the contract is
formed, thereby constraining buyers' opportunism through ex post consumer screening); see
also Gio & Porat, supra note 175, at 139-40 (arguing that if competition exists, contracts
should be enforced even if information gaps exist between firms and consumers).
187. See Avery Weiner Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 502, 502-05 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see abAo David M.
Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance oflnformation Overload: An Analysis
of Search andDisclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986).
188. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 36, at 304 ("The real problem with this kind of contract is
the buyer's ignorance, not the absence of bargaining."); Korobkin, supra note 28, at 1217 ("[T]he
principal problem is one of information acquisition.").
189. See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 501-02 (1981) (exploring how consumers produce some pre-
purchase information themselves from prior purchasing experiences, gain some information from
other consumers, and learn some information from intermediaries, such as journalists, rating
intermediaries, and others); Epstein, supra note 182, at 811, 813-14 (discussing these learning
mechanisms, and asserting that "the neoclassical case for markets rests on the. . . qualified
assumption that learning actually matters").
Over the past few decades, many have doubted that consumers can or will
inform themselves about standard form contract terms. 90 In most transactions,
a consumer has no incentive to read a standard form contract: The consumer
most likely will not understand the legal language anyway and knows that
the risk of the contract terms being invoked is very low.' 9' Moreover, a small
cadre of informed buyers may not appear because the benefits of processing
complex contract terms may not justify the costs.192  Even if some informed
buyers do emerge, they may discipline outrageous but not merely marginal
terms, again because of the costs of finding and analyzing all of the terms in
standard form contracts.' 93
2. The e-Commerce Complication
On the sidelines of this debate, a few contract scholars have asked
whether e-commerce transactions conducted online might differ from traditional
bricks-and-mortar transactions in ways that change these asymmetric infor-
mation arguments. Two lines of inquiry have evolved. First, do consumers read
electronic standard form agreements more consistently than they read paper
contracts? Second, even if they do not, do consumers have access to other
sources of information-such as consumer reviews-that might discipline
consumer contracts and thus make e-commerce contracts more efficient than
their paper counterparts? Consider each argument.
In their early work on e-commerce contracting, Robert A. Hillman and
Jeffreyj. Rachlinski saw that "[t~he ease with which consumers can compare busi-
ness practices, including the content of standard forms, suggests that consumers
190. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 182, at 596 ("[]t is particularly inappropriate to make an assump-
tion of perfect consumer knowledge.").
191. Even Judge Posner admits to not reading boilerplate contract terms. See David Lat, Do Lawyers
Actually Read Boilerplate Contracts? Richard Posner and Evan Chesler Don't; Do You?, ABOVE
THE LAW (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-
boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you.
192. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting
in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 311
(2008) (reviewing literature skeptical of the "informed minority" theory); R. Ted Cruz &
Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother' Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for
Impefect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. 635, 657-58 (1996).
193. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard
Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 853 (2006) (noting that watchdog groups "may be
insufficient to deter businesses from drafting marginal terms that may not create significant
reputational concerns but would harm consumers just the same").
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do not need judicial intervention to protect themselves from business abuse."194
Writing in 2002-early in the commercial internet's evolution-they naturally
focused on the solitary consumer sitting at home in front of a personal
computer. E-commerce generally gives a consumer access to a standard form
contract in advance of purchase, sufficient time to read the contract, and the
privacy to do so away from the pressure of salespeople or other distractions.
This increases the likelihood that a consumer will read the contract. Despite
these advantages, Hillman and Rachlinski concluded that these new technolo-
gies did not radically change consumer contracting: "[Clourts cannot simply
assume that the new tools available to e-consumers will suffice to protect them
against exploitation."'9 s Others have since taken up the argument over whether
consumers read electronic standard form contracts. Not surprisingly, the availa-
ble empirical evidence suggests that they do not.196
Part I illustrated, however, that, since Hillman and Rachlinksi's seminal
essay, we have witnessed the spread of technologies permitting mass consumer
and intermediary reviews of products, brands, and merchants.197 A second line
of argument has thus recently developed: In e-commerce transactions, consum-
ers have access to a great deal of information beyond just the contract itself.
If that information creates competitive pressures on firms to moderate their
contract terms, judicial interference in consumer contracts in the e-commerce
environment may be less justified:
The important question in the consumer transaction context asks
whether contract law should hold consumers responsible-by
denying them access to protective doctrines such as unconscio-
nability . . . that are based upon bargaining power weaknesses-for
their failure to take reasonable, low-cost steps to improve their
bargaining power and protect their ability to withhold consent. ... If
a single Internet search would [show problems with a contract], did
194. Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 32, at 478.
195. Id. at 492.
196. See Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2009) (finding that consumers do not read online terms); Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Are 'Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worsefor Buyers ? Evidence From Software
License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 309-17 (2009) (reviewing literature). But see Shmuel
I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law ofStandard Form Contracts: Misuided Intuitions and
Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BuS. & COM. LJ. 199, 212-17 (2010) (presenting
empirical evidence that consumers may read standard for m contracts more often than assumed).
197. See supra notes 103-107, 111-113, 128-135 and accompanying text.
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the consumer lack bargaining power, or just fail to access a cheap
and readily available source?198
Put differently, the internet allows consumers to evaluate a broad range of goods
pre-purchase that previously could only be evaluated post-purchase. Both
"experience goods"-which generally can only be evaluated after personal expe-
rience with the good-and "credence goods"-which are difficult to evaluate even
after experience-may transform into "search goods"-which are capable of
evaluation pre-purchasel 99-if the internet aggregates sufficient information
about those goods from multiple consumers or watchdog intermediaries.
Shmuel I. Becher and Tal Z. Zarsky have recently pursued this line of
argument, asserting that "the online realm creates market conditions and infor-
mation flows that may allow market forces to assure balanced [standard form
contracts]."200 They focus on consumer-to-consumer product reviews and
claim that certain indicia of robust consumer-to-consumer information flow
should temper courts' willingness to interfere in consumer contracts. These
indicia include that the firm promotes robust consumer conversation about the
firm's products on its website and that there is heavy consumer-to-consumer
information flow.201 Conversely, if the firm frequently changes its standard
form contracts, engages in discrimination between consumers by offering one
set of terms to the informed minority but another, more onerous set of terms
to the uninformed majority, or tampers with information exchange between
consumers, then such actions might justify judicial intervention.202
This line of inquiry is new and certainly not settled. There are various
empirical questions to be answered, and some early work suggests that online
product reviews are not always a good proxy for the quality or fairness of
consumer contract terms.203 At the same time, however, online review sites are
still in their infancy, as are mobile applications that both bring their content to
bricks-and-mortar transactions and allow consumers to easily augment phys-
ical space with review information from their mobile devices. These services
are likely to continue to improve in both quality and quantity. In general,
198. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in
the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, 108 (2006).
199. For discussion of these different types of goods, see generally Phillip Nelson, Information
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) (drawing distinctions between search,
experience, and credence goods).
200. Becher & Zarsky, supra note 192, at 345.
201. See id.at 358-59.
202. See id at 359-60.
203. See infa Part JI.C.1 (discussing problems with online reviews as a proxy for contract quality).
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therefore, the implications seem clear: secondary sources of information have the
potential to discipline consumer contracts, even if those contracts generally
remain unread.
B. Two Effects on Asymmetric Information Arguments
This background lays the foundation for considering the consequences
of an augmented reality for asymmetric information arguments in the context of
standard form contracts.
To date, contract scholarship has assumed that there are two distinct
transactional spheres: a set of contracting experiences that occur in the phys-
ical world and a separate set of online e-commerce experiences that occur in
digital space. The offline consumer is generally assumed to be uninformed and
incapable of creating market pressure to discipline standard form contracts;
the online consumer may be better informed, and in some instances sufficiently
informed to create such pressure, thereby lessening the need for courts to police
e-commerce contracts.
As we saw in Part I, however, augmented reality technologies collapse
the distinction between physical and digital space. This collapse will change
asymmetric information arguments for policing consumer standard form
contracts. In an augmented reality, consumers in physical space have access to the
full panoply of information available in digital space, which may allow them
to effectively sort firms, products, and contract terms before entering into a
contract.204  This suggests that many more consumer contracts may become
efficient, and that judicial resort to unconscionability and other doctrines to
police such contracts may be less and less justified.
At the same time, however, a seller's cost of explaining contractual terms
to consumers in bricks-and-mortar transactions is also dropping. This may
204. The argument in this Subpart has certain limited parallels with Fairfield's recent "search theory" of
contract. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1237 (2007). Fairfield argues that contract theorists need to attend more to the reality that parties
can search for contracts with which they agree, and that when they choose not to search for
or review contracts in this way, this may be a rational response to search costs. See id. at 1253-
54. I agree that search costs matter. Fairfield's focus, however, is primarily on the benefits of
standardization. See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401 (2009). My focus, on the other hand, is on showing how
technology is decreasing transaction costs-particularly sorting and signaling costs-and thereby
changing asymmetric information arguments for distrusting consumer contracts.
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actually have somewhat perverse effects if sellers use augmented reality
explanations to insulate questionable contract terms from judicial scrutiny.
Consider each argument in turn:
1. Consumers Sorting Sellers: Increased Consumer Access
to Information in Physical Space
In an augmented reality, a consumer purchasing a lawnmower in a
hardware store-or a computer in an Apple store, or an automobile at a local
car dealership-has access to the same information about the goods arrayed
in the store as another consumer has to the same goods displayed online.
This information-rich environment will likely create doctrinal pressure to
enforce standard form contracts against consumers, because it becomes more
difficult to argue that the consumer suffered from an information deficit during
the transaction.
The relevant question may not be whether a given consumer read a standard
form contract. Instead, the question may be whether consumers had ubiquitous
access to consumer and intermediary reviews that could have indicated problems
with the product or contract. If so, there may be sufficient competitive pressure
on the seller to discipline its contracts.
The doctrinal question of import may thus be whether a given consumer
had a smartphone (or other such device) at the time of contracting. Rather
than focusing on educational background or even literacy, courts may have to
begin to wrestle with the reality that technologically enabled consumers have
an advantage over those without access to such information. According to
the Pew Internet & American Life Project, roughly 62 percent of Americans
have accessed digital data-other than voice-from a mobile device.205
Approximately 35 percent of Americans own a smartphone.206 Of those, 68
percent use their smartphones to browse the internet daily; approximately
one quarter use it as their primary vehicle for online browsing.207
There is some overlap, of course, between socioeconomic factors and
access to augmented reality technology. Smartphone ownership is predicta-
bly greater among the affluent. Those earning $150,000 or more in annual
205. See JOHN HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, MOBILE ACCESS TO DATA
AND INFORMATION 1 (2008), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2008/PIPMobile.Data.Access.pdf pdf
206. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 2.
207. Id at 3.
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household income are over three-and-a-half times more likely to own a
smartphone than those in the lowest income bracket of $10,000 or less.208
Put slightly differently, roughly three quarters of high income earners own
a smartphone; less than one quarter of low income earners do.209 More than
half of those with household incomes above $75,000 own smartphones.210
Smartphone ownership also correlates with education level: Those with college
degrees are more likely to own a smartphone than those without.211 Smartphone
ownership varies by race: African Americans and Latinos are more likely than
whites to own smartphones-roughly 44 percent of African Americans and
Latinos own smartphones versus 30 percent of whites.212 Finally, smartphone
ownership correlates strongly with age. For example, even among those with
lower household incomes, the young are more likely to own smartphones.
Thirty-nine percent of 18-29 year olds earning less than $30,000 per year
own smartphones, which is roughly equivalent to the national average.213 By
comparison, smartphone ownership among low-income seniors is very low:
roughly 4 percent.214
These statistics suggest that the effects of augmented reality technologies
on the consumer experience are not uniform across demographics, and that as
new, more advanced augmented reality devices begin to integrate into daily
life, certain segments of the population will adopt them more quickly. We can
also assume that use patterns vary by demographic, although we have relatively
little data on usage as opposed to adoption. In other words, certain groups
of smartphone (or other device) owners may begin to use their augmented
reality capabilities to investigate goods or contracts prior to making a purchase
whereas other groups may not. At this point, the data on such use differences
is insufficiently granular to make predictions about how exactly these technol-
ogies will impact consumer purchasing decisions.
At the very least, however, these statistics suggest that courts may begin
to differentiate between connected and disconnected consumers-between
those with access to digital information about their transactions and those
without such access, respectively. It may well be that a consumer's level of
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connectedness becomes as important for the interpretation and enforcement
of standard form contracts as any other factor.
Courts are also likely to look closely at the actual information available to
consumers in a given context. As Part I explored, we are at the beginning of
an augmented reality and the collapse of digital and physical space. A huge
amount of new information is now available to consumers, but it is not perfectly
comprehensive. If information about a given product or contract is unavailable,
a consumer's ability to sort decreases and firms' temptations to include oppres-
sive terms in their contracts increases. The point is that contract scholarship to
date has distinguished between e-commerce or online transactions and tradi-
tional, bricks-and-mortar, consumer contracts. As augmented reality technol-
ogy makes information available everywhere, that distinction is less and less
relevant. The distinction that makes a difference is that between those with
access to augmented reality technologies and those without.
2. Sellers Explaining Terms to Consumers: The Somewhat Unclear
Implications of Decreased Costs of Explaining Contracts
In addition to consumers being better able to sort firms and distinguish
good from bad contracts prior to purchase, augmented reality technologies
create new, low-cost means for sellers to inform consumers about what certain
contract terms mean.215 Put simply, the transaction costs of contractual explana-
tion are dropping, making it feasible for sellers to invest in explaining terms
to consumers in a widespread way. Such explanation is itself a signal-but of
what? The optimistic answer is that sellers willing to explain their terms to
consumers through augmented reality technologies are signaling that they
offer consumer-friendly terms. Firms may begin to use such technologies to
advertise to consumers that their contracts are reasonable. The less charitable
interpretation is that contract law currently privileges such explanation by
insulating from later legal attack contractual terms that a seller has explained
to its consumers. As a result, the signal sent by explanation is somewhat noisy:
Consumers may not be able to determine whether a seller that explains its
contractual terms through augmented reality technologies is doing so to signal
that it has consumer-friendly terms or to insulate its consumer-unfriendly
terms. This Subpart considers both possibilities. Intriguingly, in either case the
215. For discussion of signaling, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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dropping cost of explanation may lead courts to more often enforce consumer
contracts as written.
Begin by considering why sellers' costs of explaining consumer contracts are
dropping. There are three reasons. First, firms can cheaply distribute text, audio,
graphical, or video explanations to consumers at the point of sale. In an analog
world, making a video presentation available to every consumer at the point of
sale would have been impossibly cumbersome. No merchant was going to put a
television at every cash register. 16 In an augmented reality, however, consumers
carry with them a smartphone that can receive and display such a presentation.
The distribution cost has shifted from the merchant to the consumer for reasons
completely exogenous to the contract debate: Consumers want smartphones.
This makes it possible for firms to create one presentation explaining a
contract's terms and use it at scale, globally if necessary. In an augmented reality
there is almost no incremental cost of distributing such a presentation to a
thousand consumers across the country versus one consumer next door.
Second, this distribution scale permits firms to centralize such legal explana-
tions. This gives firms control at the corporate level of the explanations given at
the local level. Whereas in an analog world a corporate legal department might
have forbade local salespeople from saying too much about contract terms for
fear that local explanations would be incorrect or somehow create liability,217
corporate counsel can control the message all the way down in an augmented
reality. Not only does augmented reality allow a firm to scale explanation, it
allows a firm to control that explanation as it scales.
Finally, the cost to firms of explanation drops because, in an augmented
reality, firms can give consumers the choice about whether to watch a given
explanation of a product or contract term. By simply embedding a QR code in
a contract's margin, 21 8 a firm can signal to a consumer that explanatory material
is available without forcing it on the consumer-as would be the case, for
example, if a firm required each consumer to watch a video at checkout. This
also avoids any negative stigma that might arise if a firm were to require
video explanations prior to allowing consumers to enter a contract. Were a firm
to impose mandatory video explanations, consumers would likely find the
requirement suspicious and assume the worst about the firm's contracts or
216. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Cashiers cannot be
expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales.").
217. See Buckley, supra note 172, at 11 (noting the agency cost problems within a seller of allowing
local salespeople to make representations about or change consumer contracts).
218. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing an example and description of QR codes).
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products. But in an augmented reality, firms can embed explanations into the
contracting experience without creating such stigma.
In addition to dropping the cost of explanation, augmented reality gives
sellers the ability to prove that consumers in fact watched their explanations.219
This can be an important element in an unconscionability analysis. As the court
in Weaver v. American Oil Co.2'0 stated, "The party seeking to enforce such a
contract has the burden of showing that the provisions were explained to the
other party and came to his knowledge and there was in fact a real and volun-
tary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting."221 In other
words, a seller must be able to prove that a robust explanation of the contract's
terms was provided. Augmented reality facilitates such proof because digital
technologies inherently permit tracking access. Thus, for example, it would be
quite simple to track and record whether a consumer watched a video embedded
in a paper contract. The seller's computer servers could log when and to whom
each video was played, and how long the consumer spent accessing that video.
These reasons establish that the cost to sellers of explaining contractual terms to
consumers is decreasing. Now consider the two possible consequences of this
change: On the one hand, this might promote more consumer-friendly terms;
on the other hand, it might do the opposite. First, there is the consumer-friendly
possibility. Transaction cost economics teaches that as the transaction costs of
disclosure drop, an unraveling effect can begin.222 Firms with the best private
information-for example, the best contract terms or product information-will
disclose that information because they gain an advantage by informing
consumers; firms with slightly less advantageous private information will then
disclose in order to distinguish themselves from even worse firms; and so on,
until all firms have disclosed.223
219. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 ("And oral recitation would not avoid customers' assertions . . . that the
clerk did not read term X to them . . .
220. 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
221. Id at 148 (emphasis omitted); see also HILLMAN, supra note 169, at 140-41 (discussing Weaver).
222. See Robert H. Gertner, Disclosure and Unraveling, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 187, at 605, 605.
223. Id (arguing that in a market where some sellers disclose information, silence will be seen as an
indication of inferior products or services).
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Early works by Paul Milgrom224 and Sanford Grossman225 independently
explored the unraveling process that occurs as those who can certify their quality
distinguish themselves from the larger pool of lower-grade labor, products, or
services.226 The theory of the unraveling effect holds that under conditions of
information asymmetry but with verifiable information and penalties for
fraud,227 each member of a pool will ultimately reveal its type, even if at first it
seems unwise for a given member to do so. First, the firm with the best trait has
reason to disclose its type because its trait is better than the average, and being
lumped together with the rest of the pool is not in its self-interest. Once the
best firm has disclosed its type, the average type remaining in the pool shifts.
Now the second-best firm has a similar interest in disclosure. The average
quality drops again. As the economist Robert Frank put it, "The unraveling
process is set in motion, and in the end all [individuals] must either [disclose] or
live with the knowledge" that others will assume they are of the "worst" type.228
In the consumer context, economists have long argued that disclosure laws
are sometimes unnecessary if the conditions for unraveling prevail. 229 The most
profound trigger of unraveling is reduced transaction costs of disclosure and
signaling: As it becomes easier to signal, the best firms will begin to do so. 230
224. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,
12 BELL J. ECON. 380, 388 (1981) (discussing the salesman's incentive to fully disclose product
quality because of a similar unraveling effect).
225. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product
Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981); S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover
Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323, 323 (1980) ("[I1f there is no transactions cost then it will always be in the
seller's interest to disclose the quality of [an] item voluntarily.").
226. Although Grossman and Milgrom are generally credited with identifing the effect, Kip Viscusi
first used the term "unraveling" in this context. See W. Kip Viscusi, A Note on 'Lemons" Markets
With Quality Certfication, 9 BELLJ. ECON. 277, 278 (1978) ("[E]nterprises or individuals at the
above-average end of the quality spectrum successively distinguish themselves from the group in a
process that unravels from the top down."); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE:
REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 86 (1983) (discussing unraveling).
227. There do not necessarily need to be formal or legal sanctions for misrepresentation. See Trevon
Logan & Manisha Shah, Face Value: Information and Signaling in an Illegal Market (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14841, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1376153 (demonstrating that male sex workers disclose face pictures
readily and accurately and that unraveling is sufficiently supported by informal enforcement
mechanisms to overcome adverse selection).
228. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
106 (1988).
229. Id (arguing that the unraveling effect makes disclosure laws unnecessary).
230. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure
Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153, 1191-92 (2011) (discussing reduced transaction costs and
their impact on the unraveling effect).
Augmented reality technology, as discussed in Part I, drastically reduces the
cost of signaling. The best firms thus may begin to include video or other
augmented explanations alongside their standard form contracts. As they do
so, other firms may be forced to follow.
Were such unraveling to take hold in the market of consumer contracts,
it would create additional market pressure on sellers with consumer-unfriendly
contracts to reform their contract terms. As sellers with the best terms explained
their terms clearly to consumers, sellers with the worst terms would find
themselves stigmatized for failing to explain their contracts, and would therefore
need to improve their consumer contracts or suffer the market consequences.
Given such market pressure, courts in such an unraveling market for consumer
contracts could assume that terms were reasonably efficient, and could thus
defer to those terms rather than policing them closely.
This is an optimistic story, but it may not be accurate. The unraveling
effect depends on the uninformed party-in this case, consumers-attributing
negative connotations to a given counterpart's choice to stay silent rather than
disclose. In other words, unraveling is driven by stigma. If consumers cannot
attach negative traits to those sellers that choose not to explain their contract
terms, then no unraveling will occur: Sellers with consumer-unfriendly terms
will be able to stay silent and not suffer undue market consequences.
One cannot know for certain what will happen as firms begin to realize that
the cost of explaining contracts to consumers has changed-it is possible
that some unraveling might occur, which would be beneficial to consumers and
might lead courts to defer to consumer contracts as written. It seems somewhat
unlikely, however, that a full unraveling will occur. This is primarily because
contract law itself muddies the water for consumers by providing an alterna-
tive reason why a given firm might choose to explain its contract terms: Such
explanation may insulate contract terms from later judicial scrutiny.
To understand this problem, return to Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.23' The Walker-Thomas court stressed that the cross-collateralization clause
was not conspicuous-it was "hidden in a maze of fine print."232 This suggests
that if Walker-Thomas had explained the term to Ms. Williams, any procedural
unconscionability might have been cured.233 As Russell Korobkin has explained,
231. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
232. Id. at 449.
233. See Meyerson, supra note 182, at 612-13 (discussing Walker-Thomas and the possibility of a seller
explaining complex terms, and arguing that "[a] seller wishing to ensure the enforceability of a
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"To generalize the point, where lack of information could cause a market failure,
sellers should be able to avoid an unconscionability determination by taking steps
to insure that buyers have the information necessary for market forces to work."234
Whether contract terms have been explained has long been a factor in
unconscionability analysis.235 As the Uniform Commercial Code puts it, "The
principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise .... u236 Gen-
erally, if the party proposing terms explains those terms to the receiving party,
a court will not find the explained provision procedurally unconscionable. As
E. Allan Farnsworth explains:
[i]t is within the drafter's power to take at least some steps to fend
off a later attack based on unconscionability because unconsciona-
bility turns on factors peculiar to each transaction, such as relative
bargaining power, the degree of sophistication, awareness and
understanding, and the presence or absence of choice. Print can be
made larger, language can be made clearer and more prominent,
attention can be called to key provisions . . . .237
This holds across contexts. Consider American General Financial Services, Inc.
v. Grifin,238 in which the court held that an arbitration agreement between a
lender and borrower was not unconscionable when the lender provided the
borrower with a document explaining in simple terms what arbitration was and
how it worked.239 Also consider Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.,240 in which
the court found an arbitration agreement to be enforceable, despite an apparent
"bargaining disparity" between the corporate employer and its employees, because
subordinate clause should be able to do so by adequately disclosing the meaning and effect of
that clause").
234. Russell Korobkin, A "Traditional" and "Behavioral" Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REv. 441, 455 (2004).
235. See8 SAMUEL WILLISTON &RICHARDA. LORD, ATREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 18:9 (4th ed. 2010) (describing elements of unconscionability, including whether the terms
were explained).
236. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2005); see alo Leff, supra note 22, at 489 (noting that the original
drafts of the UCC's section 2-302 were clear that the bargain principle dominated; if there
was sufficient "considered bargain[ing]" about a term, then courts should not interfere with
that term even if it were unconscionable).
237. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.29a (3d ed. 2004).
238. 327 F. Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
239. Id at 685-86. Other arbitration-related cases have found the same. See, e.g., Sammy Enters. v.
O.P.E.N. Am., Inc., No. 60069-9-1, 2008 WL 2010357, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. May 12, 2008)
(finding that arbitration in a standard form contract was not unconscionable where the cover page
cearly stated that disputes would be sent to arbitration).
240. 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005).
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the employer provided its employees with a cover letter to the agreement
explaining the terms and the dispute resolution policy's importance.4Or
Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc.,242 in which an employee that signed an
employment handbook containing an acknowledgement that his employment
was at will later attempted to argue that the handbook was unconscionable.2 3
The court found that the handbook was not procedurally unconscionable,
in part because the employer explained the handbook's terms to the employee. 244
Cases also exist in which courts have found that a videotaped explanation
of a contract can show intent to be bound or significantly reduce or altogether
eliminate procedural unconscionability. In Manning v. Brannon,245 for example,
the court held that a plaintiff who was injured during a skydive training jump
could not recover against the skydiving company because the exculpatory
contract signed by the parties was valid.246 The court held that the defendant's
argument-that the plaintiff intended to enter the agreement-was sup-
ported by the fact that the plaintiff had watched a video explaining its terms
prior to signing.247 Similarly, in Hartung v. J.D. Byrider, Inc.,248 the court found
that an arbitration clause was not procedurally unconscionable because, among
other things, the defendants played a "video with a skit to explain the documents"
to the plaintiffs.249 Some consumer protection statutes have also incorporated
requirements for video explanations intended to protect consumers. 250
Courts are likely to continue this trend if video or multimedia aug-
mented reality presentations become widely available to consumers. It would
be difficult to find procedural unconscionability where rich descriptions of
questionable terms were available to the consumer prior to contracting. This
suggests that in the consumer context, courts may find new reasons to enforce
241. Id at 1377-78.
242. 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998).
243. Idat 399, 402.
244. Idat 402-03.
245. 956 P.2d 156 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
246. Idatl158.
247. Id; see also Burd v. KL Shangri-Law Owners, L.P., 67 P.3d 927, 930 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003)
(noting that the plaintiff did not have access to a video as the plaintiff had in Manning, this
supported the court's finding that the contract term at issue in Burd was insufficiently explained).
248. No. 1:08-cv-00960-AWI-GSA, 2008 WL 4615044 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17,2008).
249. See id at *5; see also Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that an arbitration clause in an employment agreement was not procedurally unconscionable, in
part because all employees were shown an explanatory video at the time of employment).
250. See, e.g., Kent H. Barnett, Lending a Helping Hand?:A Guide to Kentucky's New Predatory Lending
Law, 93 Ky. LJ. 473, 497 (2005) (discussing Kentucky's predatory lending law requiring lenders
of high-cost home loans to make available a videotape explaining the borrower's rights).
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contracts as written. This also suggests, however, that consumers may have
difficulty determining why a given seller has chosen to use augmented reality
technologies to explain its contract terms. That seller may be trying to sig-
nal that it has consumer-friendly terms, but it might just as likely be trying to
insulate consumer-unfriendly terms from judicial scrutiny.
Intriguingly, in either scenario-an unraveling of consumer contracts
that puts pressure on all sellers to improve their terms, or the use of explanation
by firms to insulate their terms from judicial scrutiny-the legal effect is similar:
Courts are more likely to defer to contracts as written. This somewhat paradoxi-
cal effect would depend on a court's willingness to enforce a contract so long
as its terms have been explained. That, of course, could change, particularly if
courts begin to see sellers that appear to be strategically using augmented reality
explanations to insulate inefficient or oppressive terms. In that event, courts
might focus on substantive unconscionability even in the absence of proce-
dural unconscionability. Absent such change, however, the decreasing cost of
augmented reality explanations seems likely to lead towards more formalist
approaches to consumer contracts-whether or not this leads to pro-consumer
standard form contract terms.
C. Three Counterarguments and Their Implications
To this point, I have considered the strongest arguments that information
asymmetries will be dampened in an augmented reality. These arguments will
likely raise several legitimate objections. This Subpart briefly considers three
counterarguments: (1) that consumer review and intermediary information is of
insufficient quality to aid consumers in exerting market pressure on firms over
harsh contract terms; (2) that consumers will never be sufficiently motivated
to learn about consumer contracts, even in an augmented reality; and (3) that
such information will cause information overload, thereby raising-rather than
lowering-transaction costs for consumers.
1. Questionable Information Quality
The first likely objection to these arguments is that both consumer-
generated and intermediary-generated reviews may be insufficient to discipline
firms with consumer-unfriendly contract terms. In other words, such reviews
may not be an accurate proxy of contract quality, and therefore consumer reliance
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on such reviews in an augmented reality may change certain aspects of product
markets but not affect consumer standard form contracts.
There is an emerging technical literature about online consumer review
mechanisms and how to ensure or improve review accuracy and quality.251Var
ious general problems exist: inaccurately negative reviews submitted by
competitors; inaccurately positive reviews planted by firms about their own
products or services; the potential for reviews to skew towards the negative
because only disgruntled consumers will be motivated to post reviews; the
difficulty for a given user of determining to which reviews he should attend,
given that a particular reviewer may have very different tastes or quality stan-
dards than the user; and how to best aggregate and simplify large numbers
of reviews to accurately inform consumers without requiring them to read
hundreds or thousands of detailed comments. Certain additional problems are
relevant to the debate over consumer contract terms. In particular, some early
empirical work suggests that product reviews-focused on whether consum-
ers favored or disfavored a given product or service-may not necessarily be
contract reviews. In other words, product reviews may not be accurate proxies
of whether the contract contains pro-consumer terms. 2  The reason is simple:
A consumer's online review of a product is likely to be multi-dimensional and
judge that product based on many variables, such as product aesthetics, dura-
bility, the shopping or repair experience, whether the product lived up to expec-
tations, the usefulness of the product, and, perhaps, the consumer's experience
with the product's contract terms. The mixed nature of such reviews makes it
difficult for them to serve as pure proxies for contract quality.
These are serious concerns, and I do not have a dispositive response to all
of them. They raise empirical questions about the utility of online consumer
and intermediary reviews, and about how sophisticated the market for such
251. See, e.g., Bing Liu, SentimentAnalysis and Subjectivity, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING (Nitin Indurkhya & Fred J. Damerau eds., 2d ed. 2010); B. Pang & L. Lee,
Opinion Mining and SentimentAnalysis, 2 FOUND. &TRENDS IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 1 (2008).
252. See, e.g., Nishanth V. Chari, Discplining Standard Form Contract Terms Through Online Information
Flows:An Empirical Study, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1618, 1622 (2010) (suggesting that positive online
consumer rankings of products often correlate with more pro-seller standard form contract terms
and, therefore, that online rankings do not serve as useful consumer information as to the nature
of such terms). Chari's study is among the first to empirically test some of the issues here. The
study, however, attempted to correlate general product reviews (for example, how good is this
product?) with the one-sidedness of contract terms. Although this is one useful means of
consumer-to-consumer information exchange, Part I of this Article shows that consumers are
now sharing information about contract terms much more directly, through particularized
consumer reviews that discuss contract terms specifically.
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review information is likely to become. To this point I have largely presented
the optimistic assumption that such information will continue to improve in
quantity and quality as these young technologies mature. Consumer review
services, for example, may begin to offer easy means for consumers to rate dif-
ferent aspects of a product separately-giving a score to each of the dimensions
mentioned above, for example, or at least indicating which dimension was most
relevant to the consumer's product experience. Such separation would allow a
review site to display a scorecard about a given product or service that indicates
consumers' perceptions of each variable individually. Consumers' experiences
with contract terms seem likely to be one unique aspect of such a separation
strategy. In addition, as noted in Part I, many existing reviews already focus on
contract terms. Review services could easily begin to search for and categorize
reviews based on key words like "contract," thereby dampening the problem
of multidimensionality without requiring additional work by consumers.
In addition, reviews are likely to become more sophisticated as online
review services integrate with social networks. The travel-related review website
TripAdvisor, for example, already integrates with the social network Facebook,
allowing users on TripAdvisor to see whether their friends have posted reviews
about a given hotel or location 3.25 This at least partially overcomes the objec-
tion that online reviews are unhelpful because individuals don't know whether
other consumers share their tastes and preferences.
Further, quantity and scale can, to some extent, ameliorate concerns over
the quality or accuracy of any given review. Obviously ten thousand inaccurate
reviews are no better than ten, but ten thousand reviews are unlikely to all be
planted or skewed. Instead, large volume can give a consumer a general sense of
the problems with a given product or service, thereby dampening the effects
of any single review that is overly positive or negative.
Ultimately, these are empirical questions I cannot answer here. The solu-
tions suggested above seem likely to develop as consumer review services evolve.
We are only now beginning to experiment with the possibilities of consumer-
to-consumer sharing of product information; it is too early to judge these
offerings as imperfect when many were only launched in the last twelve months.
In addition, it is worth noting that my argument does not depend on the
market for consumer standard form contracts becoming perfectly informed.
I have simply made the related claims that this market is becoming better
253. See What Does It Mean to Sign In With Facebook?, TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com/
help/what does it mean to be facebook connected (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
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informed as the cost of signaling and sorting drop-moving towards a perfect
market, even if not attaining perfection. Even at this very early stage, however,
augmented reality technologies bring new information to consumers that has
previously been unavailable, suggesting that our approach to standard form
contracts entered into in bricks-and-mortar transactions may change.
2. Consumer Motivation
Second, one could certainly object that consumers in an augmented reality
are no more likely to be motivated to read, watch, or listen to contract-related
information than they are when confronted with paper contracts. Put diffe-
rently, no matter how augmented such information becomes, consumers will be
indifferent to it. This may have a somewhat perverse effect: If consumers remain
uninformed despite these additional sources of information, a formalist turn by
the judiciary in contract cases will be unwarranted because firms will be able to
insert exploitative terms into their contracts and will then be able to insulate
those terms via augmented reality technologies that go unused by the consumer.
Robert Hillman has recently made a similar argument in the context of
mandatory website disclosure of e-commerce contract terms.254 His concern
is that requiring disclosure of contractual terms on a merchant's website-so
that consumers could read such terms prior to purchase-might not increase
consumer information (because consumers would still not read them) and might
instead merely make those terms, however unconscionable, more enforceable
under the theory that consumers had an opportunity to become informed and
chose to ignore that opportunity.255 Procedural unconscionability might be
difficult to establish if consumers had an opportunity to read the terms prior
to contracting.256 He calls this a "legal backfire."257
There are at least two possible responses in this context, one descriptive
and one somewhat normative. The descriptive argument is that augmented
reality technologies are likely to make it easier and easier for consumers both to
access and to generate such information, as these information channels become
254. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard
Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840 (2006).
255. See id. ("[T]he only effects of [such proposals] may be to insulate businesses from claims of
procedural unconscionability and to create a safe harbor for businesses to draft suspect terms.").
256. See id. at 854 ("Perhaps marginal terms, insufficiently outlandish to motivate a court to strike
them on substantive unconscionability grounds alone, will be enforceable because of their early
disclosure on the website.").
257. See id
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embedded into our surroundings and available through multiple means with
almost no effort. Imagine, for example, that consumers could simply set their
mobile devices to inform them of negative consumer review information-
including, perhaps, setting a preference to be informed about negative reviews
of contractual terms. The consumer's mobile device could then interact with
physical products as the consumer shopped, retrieving and analyzing informa-
tion about those products on the consumer's behalf. If a given product triggered
the consumer's pre-set preferences, the device could shake, change color, or
project a warning label onto the physical good to warn the consumer that the
product raised concerns. The consumer would not have to do much of anything;
the technology would make such information part of the consumer's shopping
experience almost automatically.
In such a world, the argument that consumers will be insufficiently moti-
vated to learn of contract terms seems mostly a remnant of our realization that
consumers will not read paper contracts. That motivational hurdle, however, is
outsized compared to the minimal motivation that may ultimately be required
to become informed in an augmented reality.
If consumers do not even avail themselves of these almost costless means
to become informed, the normative response may be to ask: At what point
do we hold consumers responsible for understanding contracts when we live in an
augmented reality in which digital information about products and terms is
available prior to purchase and new sources of information (such as video
explanations) can be ubiquitously available to consumers? I do not tackle this
question here-it can wait until these evolutions occur. My hunch, however,
is that courts and commentators are likely to find that these new sources of
information justify holding consumers to their contracts. There is a limit to the
realist or contextualist tendency that has led contract law away from formalism
in the last century, and augmented reality is likely to reveal that limit.
3. Information Overload
A third possible objection runs in the opposite direction from the consumer
motivation concern: Perhaps in an augmented reality, consumers will become
so saturated with information that the information will become unhelpful. 58
In other words, although an augmented reality might lower certain transaction
258. For a wonderful futuristic video depiction of what such a world might be like, see SClVEE,
http://www.scivee.tv/node/1796S (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
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costs-related to search and data aggregation, for example-it may raise
others. The effect may be that consumers become no better informed than at
present about consumer contracts.
Again, I cannot dispose of this concern with a simple argument. It is far
too early in the evolution of augmented reality technologies to know whether
they will lead to an environment in which consumers are so overwhelmed
with information that all information becomes useless. It seems likely to me
that instead, products and services will evolve to simplify and organize infor-
mation for consumers so that it remains useful, and will give consumers the
option to choose when to be pushed information during a bricks-and-
mortar transaction and when to keep that information from view. I am
particularly interested in the ways in which scoring mechanisms-such as
the five stars commonly used in consumer reviews-are already reducing
massive amounts of data to user-friendly formats. A consumer standing in
front of five lawnmowers in a hardware store will likely want distilled
information about those five products or brands, not unrelated informa-
tion about the power drill on a nearby shelf or overly complex information
about each lawnmower's engineering specifications. But it is relatively easy
to imagine efficient ways for augmented reality technologies to communicate
condensed, useful information to that consumer-perhaps the consumer
might point a mobile device at each lawnmower, and the device's screen will
flash red if one of the products has serious product defects or contractual
problems. What information the device displays might depend on prefe-
rences that the customer input into the device. Perhaps the device is set to
warn only of serious problems with a given product, and the consumer can
therefore shop safely in the assumption that there are no issues about which to
be concerned unless the device notifies the consumer otherwise. Whatever
the solution, it seems likely that technologies will evolve to help consum-
ers better assimilate the increased amounts of information available in an
augmented reality.
This may be an unsatisfying answer for some. Some might view it as
overly optimistic about technological solutions to social problems. Those are
fair criticisms. At the same time, it is, again, early in the evolution of these
technologies. For now, it suffices to say that the information overload objec-
tion is at this point theoretical and that there are plausible, practical ways to
solve it in the future if need be.
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ITT. THE EFFECTS ON BOUNDED RATIONALITYARGUMENTS
FOR DISTRUSTING CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Let me summarize the argument to this point. Mobile computing aug-
ments physical space with digital information about places, goods, people,
firms, and contract terms. This information has become rich and ubiquit-
ously available to consumers during bricks-and-mortar transactions. Although
distrust of standard form consumer contracts is strong, such distrust rests, in
part, on the argument that consumers do not read standard form contracts
and have insufficient information with which to evaluate those contracts prior
to purchase. In an augmented reality, however, consumers have access to the
internet everywhere, and can easily search for relevant information to make
purchasing decisions. In addition, sophisticated mobile applications can now
push such information to consumers based on their location or other variables,
making it even easier for consumers to evaluate sellers and their contracts. This
should discipline firms to reform one-sided contracts. All of this suggests that
in an augmented reality, courts may again begin to enforce consumer contracts
as written.
In addition to asymmetric information arguments, however, contract
scholars have pursued a second line of argument in questioning standard form
consumer contracts. The economic theory of contract assumes that parties have
the capacity to make rational, informed decisions. However, if this assumption
fails, there is no reason to protect the outcome of the parties' choices: We can
only assume that the outcome will be welfare maximizing if the parties have
contractual capacity. Problems with capacity are thus the second traditional
justification for limiting freedom of contract.259
Contract doctrine has long protected certain classes of parties due to
concerns about capacity to contract. Infirmity, minority, and intoxication are
the traditional examples; lack of sophistication, lack of education, and lack
of knowledge are more modern examples.260 More recently, behavioral law
and economics scholars have begun to argue that cognitive heuristics, biases,
259. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 237, § 4.1 (discussing capacity as a limitation); Hermalin, Katz &
Craswell, supra note 34, § 2.3.4 (discussing capacity and bounded rationality as justifications for
limiting freedom of contract).
260. See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053,
1076-82 (1977) (discussing the "inferences of incompetence" that courts sometimes make about
the poor or undereducated).
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and errors sometimes lead contracting parties to make faulty choiceS.261
Although not fully incapacitating, these justifications for intervening in
contractual arrangements rest on a similar argument-that consumers are
incapable of fully rational decisionmaking and thus courts should police
consumer contracts.
This Part argues that the convergence of physical and digital space in
an augmented reality may limit these bounded rationality justifications for
intervening in consumer contracts. This occurs for two primary reasons: (1)
because increased information may inherently mitigate bounded rationality,
and (2) because augmented reality technologies may permit low-cost
debiasing interventions to directly dampen the effects of bounded rationality
in consumer contracting.
A. Bounded Rationality and Freedom of Contract
In the last decade, contracts scholars have turned to behavioral law and
economicS262 findings to question the efficiency of standard form contract
terms. 263 These arguments have been described as part of a "new realism" in
legal theory,264 because, at a general level, they are arguments for paternalistic
intervention into parties' contracts.265 Essentially, this literature justifies judicial
261. See, e.g., Shmuel l. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA.
L. REV. 117, 178 (2007) ("[B]ehavioral insights demonstrate that people sometimes make
bad choices even where good information is available."); Michael G. Faure & Hanneke A.
Luth, Behavioral Economics in Unfair Contract Terms: Cautions and Considerations, 34 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 337, 342-45 (2011) (reviewing behavioral law and economics of standard
form consumer contracts).
262. For a general introduction to behavioral law and economics, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law
andEconomics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
263. See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); Colin Camerer
et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism",
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization ofRational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1235 (1998); Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting"for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006).
264. See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties ofNew Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 77 (2009) ("Behavioral economics
represents a frontal assault within economics itself on the simplifying assumptions of neoclassical
law and economics.").
265. See generallyJ.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW &PHIL. 393 (2005) (connecting
paternalism arguments to the behavioral law and economics of contract).
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intervention on the grounds that errors in consumers' decisionmaking make
it possible for sellers to include exploitative contract terms in their standard
form contracts.266 This is the bounded rationality rationale for limiting freedom
of contract.
Melvin Eisenberg launched this approach to standard form contracts in his
seminal 1995 article, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract.267
Eisenberg argues that the standard economic account of contracting assumes
that consumers have the ability to weigh the costs and benefits of contract
terms and to make a rational choice that will maximize their utility. He then
reviews the literature on three major cognitive biases or heuristics that may limit
the ability of consumers to act in this rational manner. First, consumers are
subject to bounded rationality: They cannot process all available information
as a computer would, but must instead selectively attend to and incorporate
268information into their decisions. Second, consumers are subject to optim-
ism biases. In general, psychological studies have shown that adults are syste-
matically over-optimistic and tend to downplay (or mispredict) the likelihood
of negative future events.269 Third, consumers are subject to what is known as
the availability heuristic. 270 This leads them to place disproportionate weight
on easily available information when making decisions and to underemphasize
less available-but perhaps more relevant-information. 271  Thus, consumers
may ignore low-probability risks and give too little weight to future costs and
benefits as compared to present costs and benefits. 272
Using this bounded rationality research as a foundation, Eisenberg argued
that judicial intervention may be justified in cases like Williams v. Walker-Thomas
266. See Horton, supra note 176, at 1691-92 (reviewing behavioral justifications for intervention in
standard form contracts).
267. Eisenberg, supra note 28.
268. See id. at 214 ("[Hiuman rationality is normally bounded by limited information and limited infor-
mation processing.").
269. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic OptimismAbout Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY&
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 (1980).
270. See Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 220 ("When an actor must make a decision that requires a
judgment about the probability of an event, he commonly judges that probability on the
basis of comparable data and scenarios that are readily available to his memory or imagination.").
271. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 166
(Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
272. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2007) ("[B]ecause
breach of contract tends overall to be atypical, contracting parties might be vulnerable to the heuristic
and mispredict the likelihood of breach. .. )
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Furniture Co.273 He recognized that it might be rational for a consumer like
Ms. Williams to ignore a standard form contract. The costs of reading the
contract are high, as are the costs of trying to understand its terms; the potential
benefits are low; the risks of actually needing to fall back on the contract are-
or seem-very low. 274  "Rational ignorance" may therefore prevail, because
consumers have limited information processing ability and must make choices
about where to invest their attention and cognition. 275
Other contract scholars have followed Eisenberg's line of inquiry. Russell
Korobkin, for example, similarly argues that "the reason form terms deserve
scrutiny is that buyers are not fully rational, but rather make decisions in a
boundedly rational manner .. . ."276 Korobkin focuses on the psychological
finding that people often focus on salient information at the expense of less
salient, but relevant, information. In the standard form contract context, he
argues that consumers may focus heavily on more salient terms-such as price-
while ignoring other less salient terms-such as boilerplate arbitration clauses
or financing terms.277  Sellers can therefore include inefficient and self-serving
boilerplate terms, because consumers will ignore them.278 Korobkin argues that
procedural unconscionability analysis should analyze a term's salience, thereby
seeking to counteract this effect.
Like Eisenberg, Korobkin also applies his theory to Williams v. Walker-
Thomas.279 He argues that buyers like Ms. Williams are neither able to factor
all of the various terms in a standard form contract into their decisionmak-
ing nor able to compare all of those variables against competing terms from
other sellers. Thus, there is little competitive pressure on sellers to include
only efficient and reasonable terms, and there is no reason to assume that such
280
consumer contracts are welfare maximizing. In addition, like Eisenberg,
Korobkin considers the effect of optimism biases and overconfidence. He argues
273. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
274. See Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 243-44.
275. See id. at 214-16.
276. See Korobkin, supra note 28, at 1207 ("[T]he reason form terms deserve scrutiny is that buyers
are not fully rational, but rather make decisions in a boundedly rational manner, and. . . this
provides sellers with an incentive to draft non-salient contract terms to their own advantage,
whether or not such terms are efficient.").
277. See id at 1206. But see Klick, supra note 163, at 560-64 (critiquing Korobkin, and offering an
alternative hypothesis that standard form contracts serve as a price discrimination mechanism).
278. See Korobkin, supra note 28, at 1230.
279. See id
280. See Korobkin, supra note 234, at 460.
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that, at the time of contracting, Ms. Williams likely underestimated the risk
of future default and overestimated her ability to control that risk going
forward.281' Again, such biased reasoning would lead Ms. Williams to discount
the importance of the cross-collateralization clause, thus opening the door
for the seller to include the seemingly oppressive term.
Oren Bar-Gill has likewise argued that optimism biases may undermine
contractual capacity:
The force of the freedom of contract argument. . . is significantly
reduced when one (or both) of the parties to the contract holds
inaccurate perceptions of the future. The freedom of contract para-
digm is based on the presumption that contracting parties correctly
anticipate their future actions and thus the future consequences of
the contract they have signed. Without an accurate perception of the
future, freedom of contract cannot defend future-oriented contracts. 282
He focuses on consumer credit card transactionS283 and argues that consumers'
overoptimism leads them to underestimate the likelihood of negative future
events related to their credit. As a result, consumers ignore oppressive boi-
lerplate terms in credit card contracts that address adverse future contingencies
in the event that a consumer fails to pay.284 Credit card companies take advan-
tage of this imperfect decisionmaking by including oppressive long-term rates
and fees-which consumers ignore-and attract consumers with consumer-
friendly short-term pricing, such as teaser rates. 285
Like Eisenberg and Korobkin, Bar-Gill considers the implications of his
theory for Williams v. Walker-Thomas. His account differs somewhat:
Even if Williams read the relevant term and understood its formal
implications, she might still have underestimated the practical impor-
tance of this clause. Williams, when making the early purchases, may
have underestimated the likelihood of purchasing additional items
281. Seeid.at 461.
282. Bar-Gill, supra note 263, at 1415.
283. Cognitive biases have also been used to justify intervention in employment contracts, such as at-
will and arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The
Limited Return ofthe Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1800 (1996) (arguing that employees
underestimate the importance of severance agreements); Rena Mara Samole, Real Employees:
Cognitive Pychology and the Adjudication of Non-Competition Agreements, 4 WASH. U. J.L. &
POLY 289, 320 (2000) (arguing that limitations of human cognition justify judicial intervention
in noncompete clauses).
284. See also Mann, supra note 263 (discussing behavioral biases such as salience in the credit card context).
285. Bar-Gill, supra note 263, at 1376.
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from the same seller, or she may have naively believed that she
would never miss a payment. Due to the underestimation bias,
Williams may have been insufficiently sensitive to the inclusion of
the repossession clause.286
Thus, the underestimation bias allowed the Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company to include an oppressive term related to future repossession because
Williams-like most consumers-was likely to underestimate the importance of
that term. 287
B. Two Effects ofAugmented Reality on Bounded Rationality Arguments
These arguments based in behavioral law and economics are powerful,
and they have captured the imaginations of contracts scholars for the last
decade. They seem to justify intervention in consumer contracts from within
economics by calling into question the basic economic premise that contracting
parties can rationally assess their contractual opportunities and make welfare-
maximizing decisions. How do these bounded rationality arguments fare in
an augmented reality? There are two primary consequences of an augmented
reality to consider here: the possibility that the ubiquitous availability of infor-
mation will indirectly debias consumers, and the possibility of using augmented
reality technologies to purposefully and directly debias contracting consumers.
I consider each in turn below.
1. Sorting and Debiasing: General Debiasing Through
Increased Information
On the one hand, it is doubtful that augmented reality technologies will
contribute to a general debiasing of consumers.288 Many of these biases are
difficult to correct. 289 For example, simply explaining the overconfidence bias
286. Id at 1432.
287. See id
288. Hillman and Rachlinski dismissed the possibility that e-commerce consumers might be less
subject to cognitive biases than bricks-and-mortar consumers. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra
note 32, at 483 ("[A] change in the nature of the contracting environment is not likely to alter
these [cognitive] factors.").
289. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, APositive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 571, 586 (1998) (discussing the difficulty of correcting certain biases).
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is rarely sufficient to debias consumers.290 Moreover, debiasing research has
generally found that merely providing subjects with general information about
risks and probabilities does not dampen these behavioral effects.291 Therefore, a
diffused increase in information about consumer transactions seems unlikely
to counteract the overoptimism, availability, and salience biases discussed above.
On the other hand, an augmented reality may help to debias consumers
in a somewhat indirect way. As discussed in Parts I and II, in an augmented
reality, consumers are likely to have access to increased information about
products and sellers at the point of contracting because they can easily
access product reviews from other consumers and from intermediaries.292
The availability of such product and merchant reviews has debiasing
implications. Consider the salience problem. Korobkin argues that consumers
generally focus on only a few salient characteristics of a product, such as price.293
They are thus unlikely to attend to the detailed contract terms in a standard form
contract. An augmented reality, however, may provide consumers with salient
information that simplifies and counteracts this tendency. For example, although
consumers may not read a standard form contract and understand all of its
terms, they might focus on the fact that the average consumer gave that product
only one out of five stars on Amazon. Or, a consumer might pull up mostly
negative consumer reviews that highlight problems experienced with the product,
thereby making salient the likelihood of needing to depend on the warranty.
Finally, having access to consumer review information at the point of sale
might bring to the consumer's attention examples of other consumers who had
to resort to the contract and discovered its oppressive or one-sided terms.
Part I explored examples of online reviews.294 Consider just one more
example in the context of this discussion about salience. On May 5, 2011, a
consumer posted a review about Sirius satellite radio on pissedconsumer.com.
The review highlighted problems with Sirius's contracts:
I signed up for 1 year of sirius [sic] radio in April of 2010. I did not
want it to continue, so I let it expire without renewing. The radio
290. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES, supra note 271, at 422 (discussing debiasing techniques); Emily Pronin et al.,
Understanding MisundeNtanding: Social Pychological Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 660 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
291. See generally Fischhoff, supra note 290.
292. See supra Part LB.4 (discussing these technologies).
293. See supra notes 278-280 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part I; suprwa notes 103-107, 111-113, 127-134 and accompanying text.
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stops working (makes sense). Then I start getting statements saying
I'm past due.... Turns out when you sign up for one year of service
ifts actually open ended! They keep charging, you have to spend a few
hours calling . . . to cancel your 1 year contract. Oh, and if you try to
cancel early there's an early termination fee. . . . I don't know if a 1
year contract that they decide is open ended is legal, but it's defiantely
[sic] unethical and sleazy.. . . Stay away!295
This sort of virulent consumer review is highly salient-certainly more salient
than the dry legal language of standard form contracts. If a given product or
merchant received a sufficient number of such reviews, an informed consumer
would almost certainly take notice.
In addition, mobile applications often aggregate and simplify reviews of
consumer products using rating systems, which also counters the availability and
salience problems noted by Korobkin and others. Pissed Consumer's mobile
application, for example, uses a "Five Red Star" system. The more red stars a
product receives from other consumers, the higher the volume of consumer
complaints. 296 Likewise, the Better Business Bureau's mobile application grades
merchants on the standard academic A+-to-F scale. These grades are based
on the Bureau's complaint history with the business, the type of business, time
in business, availability of background information about the business, licens-
ing or other governmental actions against the business, advertising issues, or
failure to honor commitments to the Bureau.297 The Better Business Bureau also
accredits merchants, and the mobile application indicates in a very simple-and
salient-graphical way which local businesses have received their accreditation.298
These mobile offerings are new-Pissed Consumer and the Better
Business Bureau launched their respective mobile applications in the spring of
2011. As these services mature and expand, such ratings systems are likely
to become more sophisticated. In particular, they may begin to differentiate
between types of complaints, and make it even easier for a consumer to search
for complaints about a seller's contract terms as opposed to other aspects
of the seller's goods or services. Even in their current form, however, these
295. Sirius Keeps Billing After Contract Expires!, PISSED CONSUMER (May 31, 2001),
http://sirius-satellite-radio.pissedconsumer.com/sirius-keeps-billing-after-contract-expires-2011
0531240638.html.
296. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing pissedconsumer.com).
297. See Overview of BBB Grade, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/business-
reviews/ratings (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (explaining its grading methodology).
298. See id.
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simplified ratings services may serve to counteract bounded rationality in
consumer purchasing decisions by producing highly salient information
that consumers can easily digest.299
In addition to ameliorating salience effects, an augmented reality may also
counteract consumers' overconfidence about the future and apparent tendency
to underestimate the probability of negative future events. Reading online
consumer reviews highlights the obvious but important fact that sheer volume
of experience uncovers even very low-probability contingencies. When
thousands of consumers have experience with a product or merchant, tens or
hundreds will stumble into the unlikely, but inevitable, contingencies. If the
seller's standard form contract took advantage of the fact that consumers
were unlikely to think about such low probability contingencies ex ante-by
including a one-sided term about such contingencies-ex post that one-
sidedness will be discovered as it is triggered by a given consumer s experience.
Later consumers reading an online review will therefore be on notice of that
possible contingency and will likely factor it into their calculus about whether
to purchase the product or service in question. Even if a given consumer
chooses not to read every online review-and thus fails to learn about all of
the discovered contingencies-feedback about such low probability events gets
factored into the aggregated ratings on these websites. This creates a sorting
proxy that may counter the availability heuristic. Consumers may not need to
factor future contingencies into their ex ante evaluation of a product or contract
if the electronic market of reviews does this for them.
At one level, this suggests that newer products and consumer contracts
deserve greater judicial scrutiny than their more established counterparts.
Early adopters who purchase without the benefit of this electronic hindsight
may stumble into one-sided terms. Later consumers should not-or, at least,
they should be on notice and able to factor the costs and benefits of such terms
into their decisions.
At another level, in an augmented reality, sellers should begin to anticipate
these effects and realize that online information exchange will warn consum-
ers away from one-sided contracts. As the standard law and economics model
predicts, they should therefore avoid including one-sided terms to begin with.
299. As mentioned in Part I, mobile technology also allows consumers to create simplified product
reviews during bricks-and-mortar shopping experiences. Research suggests that consumers
prefer simplified "star rating" type systems for creating such reviews quickly. See, e.g., Felix von
Reischach et al., A Mobile Product Recommendation System Interacting With Tagged Products,
PERCOM 2009, Mar. 2009 (reviewing research on mobile recommendation systems).
Augmented Reality and Freedom of Contract 739
2. Signaling and Debiasing: Targeted Debiasing by Firms or Regulators
In addition to bringing contract-relevant information to the point of sale,
augmented reality technologies allow firms and regulators to purposefully try
to debias consumers. In high-value transactions, sellers may want to address
bounded rationality problems directly to insulate their standard form contracts
from later judicial attack. Alternatively, regulators may want to use augmented
reality technologies to reach consumers at the point of sale and to nudge
them to make better decisions.300 Consider this second mitigating effect on the
bounded rationality justification.
Targeted information can, in some circumstances, help to debias consum-
ers.3 0' As Linda Babcock has noted, "In the literature on debiasing, one type
of intervention stands out as effective against a wide range of biases. This
involves having subjects question their own judgment by explicitly consi-
dering counterarguments to their own thinking."302 Warning labels on cigarettes
and alcohol are an example, as are risk disclosures to consumers prior to
entering into credit or other sensitive transactions.303 In general, requiring
subjects to consider contrary evidence has had greater success in countering
overoptimism biases than merely providing generalized information about the
biases themselves.3 04
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein argue that debiasing efforts can use
one aspect of bounded rationality-the availability heuristic-to counteract
another-overoptimism. "[B]ecause making an occurrence available to indi-
viduals will increase their estimates of the likelihood of the occurrence, availa-
bility is a promising strategy for debiasing those who suffer from excessive
optimism." The key is to expose subjects to a "concrete instance of the
300. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
301. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 913, 917 (1999) (finding that explaining the overconfidence bias to mock litigants and
urging them to consider the weaknesses of their case helped to mitigate self-serving biases).
302. Id. at 916.
303. See Bar-Gill, supra note 263, at 1420 (arguing that "[i]nformation-based intervention has been
proven feasible and effective in other contexts [besides credit cards]," and citing smoking
disclosures and anti-drug advertising campaigns as examples).
304. See, e.g., Richard P. Larric1, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 316, 323-24 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (reviewing
"consider the opposite" debiasing strategies); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism L an
Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1245, 1277 (2005) (reviewing literature on successful debiasing).
305. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 47, at 210.
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occurrence." 306 This tends to "render the incident in question available in a
way that can successfully counteract optimism bias." 07 In a classic study, for
example, Weinstein attempted to counteract the fact that due to overoptim-
ism, people tend to underestimate their likelihood of getting cancer. When
Weinstein told subjects a detailed story about a similar person-of their age
and in their circumstances-getting cancer, the subjects' probability estimates
became more accurate. 08
Jolls and Sunstein argue that one could use the law to debias consumers
by requiring manufacturers to provide examples of the consequences of harm-
producing uses of their products, rather than merely providing statistics or a
generic warning label: "[I]n the consumer safety context the law might require
that the real-life story of an accident or injury be printed in large type and
displayed prominently so that consumers would be reasonably likely to see
and read it before using the product."309 This is targeted debiasing: trying to
influence a consumer's decision by exposing the consumer to particularized
information intended to change the consumer's probability assessments.
Augmented reality offers novel methods for such debiasing. As discussed
in Part II, augmented reality is rapidly lowering the cost of distributing videos,
for example, as well as images and audio. This makes it possible to create very
vivid messages and deliver them to consumers pnor to contracting.
Computer scientists are already exploring various methods of nudging
consumers using mobile technology. Researchers have, for example, used
ambient display installations to influence workers' decisions about whether
to use stairs or elevators, leading to healthier choices often without workers'
conscious awareness that their behaviors are changing.310 Similarly, the
"Augmented Shopping Cart" includes an ambient handlebar display connected
to a bar code scanner: When a shopper scans an item before putting it in the
cart, the cart's handlebar changes colors to communicate nonobvious envi-
ronmental, nutritional, or other information to the shopper.31' This can alter
306. Id
307. Id
308. See Weinstein, supra note 269; see also Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic
Optimism: Present and Future, 15 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1996) (reviewing studies).
309. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 47, at 213.
310. See Yvonne Rogers et al., Ambient Influence: Can Twinkly Lights Lure andAbstract Representations
Trigger Behavioral Change?, UBICOMP 2010, Sept. 2010, at 261.
311. See Jon Bird et al., The Augmented Shopping Trolley: An Ambient Display to Provide Shoppers With
Non-ObviousProductInformation, PINC 2011, May 8, 2011 (describing project); Vaiva Kalnikaite
et at., How to Nudge In Situ: Designing Lambent Devices to Deliver Salient Information in
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the consumer's decisionmaking.312  Mobile phone-based applications have
been used to promote smoking cessation,3 13 dieting, exercise, medication
management, environmentally-friendly transportation choices, and other desired
social practices.314
Consider consumer credit card contracts. Ronald Mann has argued persu-
asively that debiasing interventions are both necessary and possible in the
credit card sector. 31 5 To make such interventions succeed, Mann focuses on
the need to provide simple, powerful information to consumers at the point of
contracting.316 This is much easier to do in an augmented reality. Messages can
be communicated directly to consumers at the point of sale and displayed in
vivid graphics or in other formats likely to resonate with consumers. If any
debiasing is going to succeed, AR-enabled interventions seem the most likely.
This approach aligns with what Colin Camerer and his colleagues have
called "asymmetric paternalism"-interventions that assist uninformed consum-
ers without imposing costs on the informed.31' They cite as an example the
disclosure that creditors must make to mortgage applicants under the Federal
Truth in Lending Act:318
The Act provides potentially substantial benefits to those who are less
than rational; it may save some consumers, otherwise uninformed,
Supermarkets, UBICOMP 2011, Sept. 2011 (finding that the augmented "shopping handle
generated a significant nudge effect, influencing what products people chose and placed in their
shopping trolleys").
312. See, e.g., Jasminko Novak, Ubiquitous Computing and the Socially-Aware Consumer-Support
Systems in the Augmented Supermarket, PROC. OF THE FIRST INT'L WORKSHOP ON SOC.
IMPLEMENTATION OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2005) (examining use of technology to
nudge consumers toward socially desired decisions).
313. See Robyn Whittaker et al., Mobile Phone-BasedInterventions for Smoking Cessaion, 4 COCHRANE
LIBRARY (2009) (reviewing literature).
314. See, e.g., Parisa Eslambolchilar et al., Nudge & Influence Through Mobile Devices, MOBILEHCJ
2010, Sept. 2010, at 527 (reviewing literature, and noting that "[t]he use of digital technology is
central to make behavioral changes").
315. See Mann, supra note 263, at 921 ("One approach would rely on information campaigns designed
to respond to the availability heuristic, making consumers more cognizant of the effects of
excessive borrowing by telling consumers about them.").
316. See id. ('"I]f the point of contracting is not a salient point in the psyche of the consumer, a
regime altering the information available at the points of purchase. . . could be productive."); see
also RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 160 (2006) (arguing that "the most obvious point to focus a
disclosure would be at the point of borrowing" and that "a judicious response would settle for
the disclosure of information that is sufficiently simple to be understood by a typical cardholder
and to be implemented by an issuer relatively cheaply').
317. See Camerer et al., supra note 263, at 1213 (discussing asymmetricpaternalism).
318. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006).
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from possible catastrophic outcomes, such as losing their homes.
These benefits are obtained at minimal cost to both informed
consumers and providers. Educated consumers essentially ignore
the mandated disclosures while uneducated consumers could poten-
tially reap the positive benefits of additional information. As for
[mortgage] providers, . . . [a]ny early costs incurred with the initial
creation of the disclosure. . . appear minimal when amortized. 1
The disclosure states: "If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a mortgage
on your home. You could lose your home, and any money you have put into it,
if you do not meet your obligations under the loan."320 Informed consumers
who already understand this risk will ignore such warnings; uninformed
consumers may take notice.321
In an augmented reality, tailoring such disclosures or debiasing interven-
tions to the uninformed becomes easier. Consumers might be permitted to
choose whether to watch a given video presentation, for example, if they
met certain criteria, such as education, income, or other relevant thresholds.
Otherwise, reviewing the presented information might become required. This
sort of regulatory tailoring is far more difficult in an analog environment; an
augmented reality opens new regulatory options. Sellers might also choose
to require exposure to certain information. In a world with facial recognition
and other biometric identification technologies, sellers are likely to know the
identity of consumers even in bricks-and-mortar transactions. Sellers will
therefore have the ability to tailor debiasing interventions to the characteristics
of individual consumers.
For our purposes, it does not much matter whether such debiasing strat-
egies are designed by regulators or sellers. Augmented reality technologies
might make such debiasing interventions more effective than debiasing efforts
in an analog economy.
Finally, this subsection provides one last comment on debiasing in an aug-
mented reality. There is the risk of information overload if all consumer goods
become saturated with digital information. As Camerer puts it, even in the
analog world "[w]hen hammers start to sprout warnings of the danger they pose
to thumbs, and ladders of the risk of falling, additional information confers ever
smaller benefits and can actually backfire if it distracts consumers from more
319. Camerer et al., supra note 263, at 1233.
320. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1)(B).
321. See Camerer et al., supra note 263, at 1233 ("For the naive consumer, the disclosure can be
enormously beneficial, moving her one step closer to educated consumer status.").
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worthy warning messages."322 In an augmented reality, this could become com-
ical: If every consumer good has augmented reality video presentations associated
with it, consumers will ignore all such information-there is no time to watch
an explanatory video about a box of Tic Tacs.
Computer scientists and ambient informatics researchers are already
confronting this problem when considering the effects of augmented reality
technologies on information flow to consumers. As Yvonne Rogers has put it:
[R~ecent research in cognitive psychology has shown people tend
to use simple heuristics . . . when making decisions. .. . We typically
ignore most of the available information and rely only on a few impor-
tant cues.. .. [R]ather than providing ever more information to enable
consumers to compare products in minute detail when making a
choice, a better strategy is to design technological interventions that
provide just enough information and in the right form to facilitate
good choices. 323
One recent study, for example, examined several modalities-star rating
systems, text blocks, and videos-for communicating product review infor-
mation to consumers via mobile phones.324 It found that consumers prefer
simplified, quick information modalities, such as star ratings, rather than more
complex, time-consuming text or video presentations.32 5
These are very new problems, and this is preliminary research. Designing
appropriate augmented reality technologies that achieve this balance will
present both technological and regulatory challenges. Regulatory interven-
tion might become necessary at some point to control the use of augmented
reality technologies for debiasing or "warning label" purposes. Consumer protec-
tion law should take account of these technologies and begin to consider how
to best employ them. This is not a contract law problem per se, but instead a
322. Id. at 1235.
323. Yvonne Rogers et al., Projecting Instant Information In Situ: Can It Help LA Make More Informed
Decisions,?, PERVASIVE 2010 WORKSHOP ON PERSONAL PROJECTION, May 2010.
324. See Felix von Reischach et al., An Evaluation of Product Review Modalities for Mobile Phones,
MOBILEHCI 2010, Sept. 2010.
325. See id. at 207 ("[D]evelopers of product-related services on mobile phones should ... not
focus on providing as much information as possible, but rather present precise and well-
structured information.").
A technical literature has developed on how best to glean information from online consumer
reviews and incorporate it into mobile recommendation systems. For an overview, see Silvana
Aciar et al., Informed Recommender: Basing Recommendations on Consumer Product Reviews, 22
INTELLIGENT SYS. 39 (2007) (discussing various studies).
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consumer protection problem of how to best use these new methods of infor-
mation dissemination.
CONCLUSION
Doctrinally, we have come full circle. Traditionally, courts deferred to
contracts as written, believing that consumers' consent to those contracts jus-
tified enforcement. As standard form contracts proliferated, courts realized that
consumers had insufficient information to evaluate those forms, and that firms
could therefore include oppressive or one-sided terms. Courts began to distrust
standard form consumer contracts and began to police them using doctrines
such as unconscionability.
Today, however, we live in a connected digital world. The doctrines born
out of judicial distrust for standard form contracts were created before com-
puters, the internet, or wireless technologies-before consumers had constant
real-time access to information about the places, goods, people, firms, and
contracts around them. In short, critical aspects of contract law were designed
to resolve the problems of an economy in which contracting parties knew
relatively little about each other, the goods they were trading, or the markets
in which they operated. By contrast, today's information technologies increa-
singly create an augmented reality in which digital and physical spaces are
profoundly interwoven, and in which such types of information are ubiquit-
ously available. Consumers can now sort firms and their contracts at lower cost
and more efficiently, and firms can now signal their consumer-friendly contract
terms to consumers. As our augmented reality develops, courts will-or
should-begin to take notice of these changes to the economy that suggest
changes to contract doctrine.
Contract theory must also take account of these changes to the economy's
basic information infrastructure. Technological development can fundamentally
change transaction costs. This may not occur often-indeed, changes profound
enough to alter transaction costs in a significant way may occur once in a gen-
eration. But we are experiencing such a shift, and this illustrates the importance
to contract theory of recognizing how contract doctrine is contingent on
underlying technological and economic conditions.
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